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Introduction*

The persistence of Sendero Luminoso’s2 insurgency since 1980 has produced a number

of outstanding works on the history and politics of the movement. Nevertheless, the
role of unrealized expectations and the ideological attraction of SL’s political violence,
while often insinuated, has received less than thorough attention. Although several

works examine Sendero’s ideology,3 none have yet considered the correlation between
incongruent expectations and the ideological appeal of armed struggle. A possible

reason for this neglect could be the perceived simplicity and remoteness of Sendero’s
Gonzalo Thought ideology. Yet, Senderismo continues to inspire a small group of

extremely violent guerrillas.
Field research for this work was carried out in Peru during the first two weeks of July,
1996. The investigation was conducted in Lima at the Institute de Estudios Peruanos (IEP), the
Centro de Promotiony Desarrollo Poblacional (CEPRODEP), the U.S. Embassy, U.S. Information
Service (USIS) library, and various other institutions.

2 The name “Sendero Luminoso” comes from a party newspaper published by PCP-SL
Chairman Abimael Guzman. The masthead of this paper referred to the Communist Party of Peru
by the Shining Path of the thought of Jose Carlos Mariategui (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 323).
When referring to PCP-SL, the names Sendero Luminoso, Sendero, PCP, SL, and others are typically
used interchangeably. Incidentally, the word “Senderismo” can be translated as “Senderoism.”
3 For example, G.L. Vasquez, “Peruvian Radicalism and the Sendero Luminoso,” Journal
of Political and Military Sociology 21 (Number 2, 1993), 197; Manuel Jesus Granados, “El PCP
Sendero Luminoso: aproximaciones a una ideologia,” in Juicio a Abimael, ideologia y realidad, ed.
Raul Vento Garcia, 35-148 (Lima: Pueblo Libre, Agenda 2000 Editores, 1993); Michael Robertson,
“Latin American Revolutionaries in the Post-Soviet Era: The Case of Sendero Luminoso,” Strategic
Review 20 (Number 1, 1993), 42-49; James M. Greene, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: Ideology and
Practice” (Honors paper, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy, 1990);
Carlos Ivan Degregori, Que dificil es ser Dios: Ideologia y violencia politica en Sendero Luminoso
(Lima: El Zorro de Abajo Ediciones, 1990).
VI

This paper argues that Sendero Luminoso’s ideological promotion of political

violence is attractive to some disenfranchised individuals whose aspirations are
unsatisfied by their achievements. However, it does not assert that achievement

discrepancy alone has automatically translated into political violence. The presence of
a relatively well organized revolutionary organization capable of channeling frustration

into action has been a decisive ingredient in Peru’s insurgency. The combination of
these two elements has contributed significantly to the growth of armed subversion in

Peru.4
This work is novel because it goes beyond the prototypical analysis of political,
economic and statistical factors.

Sendero’s ideology will be theoretically and
I

empirically evaluated through the movement’s proclamations, propaganda, and

behavior. The relation between the Andean legacy of violence and Peru’s profound

lack of equity will be linked to the ideological appeal of Sendero’s ultra-egalitarian

4 It is important to remember that “.. . insurgency is a syncretic phenomenon—one that joins
diverse elements in an explosive mix. It combines ... the ideology and organization of modem
‘revolution’; and . . . the operational doctrines of guerrilla warfare”(Desai and Eckstein 1990, 442).
Similarly, Sendero’s “. . . [armed] struggle came about because of a conjunction of two factors: the
index of misery and frustration in rural Peru was high, and a remarkable movement stood ready to
take advantage of that anger. In some ways Peru does conform to the classic theory of the ‘j-curve’”
(Stern, P. 1995, xviii). A considerable portion of those convicted of terrorism in Peru come from
relatively well-off backgrounds, with expectations that frequently contrast sharply with their
occupations [Trans.] (unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Spanish are mine) (Chavez de
Paz 1989, 57). Many Senderistas “. . . are not the poorest peasants. They are provincial intellectuals,
a group which felt its mobility was frustrated” (Mauceri 1996). At the same time, a revolutionary
organization was developing that could channel this frustration into political violence.
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communist ideology. The essay will focus on the years 1990 to 1995; however, it also

examines events outside this time for greater understanding of the movement.
Chapter one outlines Sendero Luminoso as a contemporary guerrilla movement. It
then examines the influence of Andean historical factors on the Peruvian revolutionary

situation. Long-term causes of rebellion are linked with PCP-SL’s formation as a

guerrilla movement. Chapter two is a theoretical and historical evaluation of the

insurgents as a revolutionary political party.

Various theories of revolution are

examined to determine if any explain the rise of SL. Chapter three discusses the

relation between incongruent aspirations and achievements with Sendero’s growth as

a subversive organization. Peruvian equity, or a lack of it, is considered to ascertain
its contribution to Senderismo’s ideological appeal.

Chapter four evaluates the

pragmatic application of political violence in Peru. It describes and analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of PCP-SL’s strategy of protracted people’s war. Chapter

five concludes this essay by postulating on the relationship between unfulfilled

expectations, ideology and insurgency in Pern.

viii

Chapter I

Sendero Luminoso and the Andean History of Insurrection

When the residents of Lima awoke early on December 26, 1980 “. . . to find dead dogs
adorned with signs reading ‘Deng Xiao-Ping, son of a bitch’ hanging from the

lampposts of their ancient city, they could not possibly have known that they were
standing on the edge of an abyss which would plunge their country into the most
savage, prolonged, and bitter struggle it has ever known” (Stem, P. 1995). By 1990
it was estimated that an insurrection by a Maoist splinter group of the Peruvian

Communist Party, the Partido Comunista del Peru por el Sendero Luminoso del
Pensamiento de Jose Carlos Mariategui, and the Peruvian Government had cost the
lives of more than 25,000 noncombatants (United States Congress 1992a, I).1 The
estimated $20 billion in property damage caused by PCP-SL is roughly equal to Pern’s

foreign debt, and more than equal to its GNP (Radu 1992, 17). In this context, the

analysis of Peru’s insurgency has become an increasingly popular topic among political

1 According to Amnesty International, “[a]ccurate statistics on the total number of people
killed by security forces and the armed opposition during the internal conflict in Peru are not
available. . . . [The] Institute) Constitution y Sociedad . . . puts the number of dead in the ongoing
conflict at 25,544. . . . The Coordinadora National de Derechos Humanos. . . claimed that 26,149
people had been killed in the period 1980-1992" (Amnesty International 1993, 2). It is important to
remember that “[t]he best statistics on the war come from the respected research center DESCO
(Centro de Estudios y Promotion del Desarrollo) and the Peruvian Senate’s Comision Especial sobre
Violencia Politicoy Pacification. It should be noted, however, that these two groups base many of
their calculations on a pair of unreliable sources: newspaper reports and military communiques”
(Starn 1992, 212).

1

2

scientists.

Many scholars would agree that the best understanding of Sender©

Luminoso comes from an examination of the guerrillas themselves.

i

Analysis of a Contemporary Guerrilla Movement
To understand the nature of Sendero Luminoso as a revolutionary political party, it is

necessary to know the history of communist organizations in Peru which led up to the
formation of SL. The Partido Comunista Peruana (PCP), founded in 1928, never

achieved a mass following with its pro-Moscow party line. A reason for this was the
popularity of its main ideological rival, the nationalist Alianza Popular Revolucionaria

Americana (APRA). Another reason for the failure of the PCP to gain support, was
their compromising with the government. For example, the PCP supported the leftist

military government of General Valesco Alvarado (1968-1974) (Berrios and Blasier
1991, 378).

The split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions seriously weakened the PCP in
1964. Several pro-Chinese groups splintered, with the Maoist faction calling itself

Bandera Roja. This party split again in 1970, becoming the militant PCP-Patria Roja?

Other Maoist splinter groups included the Partido Revolucionario—Trinchera Roja,

2 Patria Roja is currently an enemy of PCP-SL because of its . . [s]upport for the Peruvian
government’s genocidal war against the PCP-led Peoples War (Committee of the Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement 1995a, 48).”

I

3

and the PCP Sendero Luminoso (Berrios and Blasier, 378). Abimael Guzman was the
leader of the Ayacucho (Quechua for “Comer of the Dead”) chapter of Bandera Roja.

hi 1970 PCP-BR expelled Guzman for “leftist opportunism.” Guzman then formed his
own Maoist faction of the PCP, which became later known as Sendero Luminoso.

i

II

Guzman, known to his followers as “Chairman Gonzalo,” is the illegitimate son of

a middle-class family in Arequipa. An exceptional student, he earned two degrees, one
in philosophy, one in law from the University of Arequipa. In 1962, Guzman was

appointed as an instructor, and later an administrator, at the Universidad Nacional San
Cristobal de Huamanga (UNSCH), in the impoverished Andean Department of
Ayacucho. Sometime between 1965 to 1967 Guzman traveled to China during the

Cultural Revolution where he received political and military training. Upon returning

to Peru, he resumed teaching at UNSCH. This university environment allowed
Guzman the opportunity to indoctrinate students in Iris political views, or Gonzalo
Thought. After graduation, a number of former students went to live in desperately

poor Andean communities where they inculcated peasants with the “scientific ideology
of Gonzalo Thought.”
Between 1970 and 1980 Sendero was relatively successful in building its mass base,

especially in the impoverished departments that the government in Lima has

4
traditionally neglected.3 In May of 1980 the movement announced its initiation of the

armed struggle by burning ballot boxes in Chuschi, Cangallo province, Ayacucho
[Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 809). In many ways, the immoderate level of violence which

occurred over the ensuing sixteen years has been the product of centuries of
oppression. Like many issues in Peru, a thorough understanding of PCP-SL begins in

the past.

The Andean Historical Contribution
Historical factors have played a decisive role in the formation of Andean insurgencies.4

From the very beginning of the Spanish conquest, the indigenous Andean peoples have
been the recipients of the structural violence and inequality endemic in Spam’s

conquest and subsequent colonialism. Because the Incas and their predecessors lacked
a written language, what is known of Pern’s history of violence begins on the plains of

3 Sendero’s success at building base areas has been far more successful in regions with no
tradition of democracy. The vertical and authoritarian characteristics of Sendero, and their recourse
to terror, have been more acceptable to those who had historical experience with this type of
violence. The political traditions of the Andean world and their experiences with the structural
violence of gamonalismo (the rule of semi-feudal land owners) provided the historical basis for the
support of SL [Trans.] (Manrique 1990, 54).
4 While long term history is a factor in the Andes,
. social scientists and theoreticians are
somewhat disposed to look at the shorter time frames alone and to restrict ‘history’ to decades rather
than centuries. If long-term phenomena are mentioned, they may be presented as mere historical
‘background’ to orient the reader, not as a source of explanatory tools incorporated into the analysis”
(Stern S. 1987, 12).

5
Cajamarca in the sixteenth century.

Atahualpa

Shortly after arriving in Peru, the Spanish conquistadores arranged a meeting with the
Inca ruler Atahualpa in Cajamarca. Here, one of the most definitive events in the
history of the Americas played itself out in only a few hours. Narrated by generations

of historians, with many varying accounts, a Spanish friar with a bible met Atahualpa:
In Guaman Poma’s version of the encounter . . . Atahualpa . . . [played] the role of
ruler by issuing a challenge to the friar’s authority for having asserted that Atahualpa’s
gods were frauds and his God the true one: “Fray Vicente responded that his gospel,
his book, had told him. And Atahualpa said: ‘Give me the book so that it may speak
to me.’ And so he gave it to him, and . . . [Atahualpa] took it in his hands and began
to flip through the leaves of the book. And the Inca said ‘What? How is it that it
does not tell me? It does not tell me? It does not even talk to me, that book!’
Speaking with great majesty, seated on his throne, the Inca Atahualpa flung the book
from his hands. . . .” (Seed 1991, 28)

Few historians debate what occurred shortly afterwards; hidden Spaniards

.1

.

launched the ambush with the prearranged signal. . . . The Spaniards fell upon them

and began to kill [Indians]. . . . And since the Indians were unarmed they were routed
without danger to any Christian” (Hemming 1970,41-42). Atahualpa was captured and
subsequently executed due to

. . the crude political maneuvering of Pizarro . . .

[which was] dressed up with religious reasons and made to appear as the first sentence
passed by the Inquisition in Peru” (Mariategui 1971, 131).

I
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Atahualpa’s dropping of the Bible symbolized the rejection of Christianity, the
written word, and European culture which justified Spain’s conquest. The meeting
between Atahualpa and Pizarro laid the groundwork for an intensely bifurcated social

system. The impetus for subsequent political violence arises from this unjust social

system, and its accompanying structural violence.5

f
The Duality of Andean Existence
In conquering the Incas, “[t]he Spanish conquistadors destroyed . . . [the Inca’s]
impressive productive machine without being able to replace it. The indigenous society

and the Inca economy were wholly disrupted and annihilated by the shock of the
conquest” (Mariategui 1971, 4). Conquest formed the basis for the two souls of Peru

that developed in the colonial period, and linger on in more subtle ways even today.

While many indigenous Andeans fatalistically accepted the Spanish domination of
the viceroyalty, many of the oppressed actively rebelled against the yoke of imperialist
repression.

Between 1720-1790 there were more than one hundred insurrections

5 Violent revolt is a common theme throughout Andean history; indeed, “. . . the Andean
image of history included also a vision of the future. Twentieth-century versions of this history are
commonly known as the Inkarri myth. The Inca will come back to reorder the world and to put
everything in its proper place. The Inca’s return is associated with a moral cleansing, the destruction
of Spaniards and sinners. In . . . Cotabambas, an insurrection to restore Tawantinsuyu started with
the news that the Inca had appeared. Everyone knew what should be done: the misti and wiraquca
(mestizos and Spaniards) should be killed” (Stem S. 1987, 179).

7
against the Spanish Government (Stem, S. 1987, 34). In a sense, these rebellions

served as an expression of cultural identity:
In Andean rebel eyes, the extermination of “Spaniards,” vital to the “moral cleansing”
that would usher in a new era, enjoyed the approval of the king of Spain and the
Christian God! The insurrectionists placed the Spaniards in the Andean category of
nak'aq, a Quechua term for humanoid beings considered criminal, beastly, and
demonic. The human status of such beings was ambiguous, for they stood apart from
normal humanity as parasitic antisocials whose own wellbeing was predicated on
destroying human life. ... In the eyes of the insurrectionists, these Spaniards had
rebelled against the king of Spain and the Christian God. Indeed, the mythical
“Spain” situated “across the sea,” a powerful and distinctive realm distant from the
world of humans in America, had no necessary connection to, and in no way
legitimized, the colonial “Spain” of Spaniards in Peru. In killing “Spaniards,” the
insurrectionists killed traitors and heretics. (Stem, S. 1987, 145)

Stem’s description of the dichotomy between the colonial Spaniard and the “mythical”
Spain typifies the duality of Andean existence. Paradoxically, the imperialists were
fought in the name of the imperialist power. The Spanish responded to indigenous
revolts with extreme violence. “In Pern, the legacy included an assault on the memory

of the Inca past, a reorganization of late colonial mechanisms of social control, a bitter
hardening of social fears and tensions, and a strong creole tendency toward royalism

during the Wars of Independence” (Stem, S. 1987, 35).6

6 Following independence from Spain, the“ .. ‘Aristocratic Republic’ reinscribed the familiar
logic of control by a white elite, and the divorce between brown and white, mountains and coast, and
poor and rich remained a dominant feature of the topography of the nation” (Stam, Degregori and
Kirk 1995, 215). An example of these divisions occurred during the War of the Pacific when rich
Peruvian land owners collaborated with the Chilean invaders, rather than join the peasants who were
fighting the Chileans. “The elite viewed all action by the peasant guerrillas as race—or
class—motivated pillage, whereas the peasants perceived elite attempts to protect their property as
treachery to the national resistance” (Mallon 1995, 183).

!
■

8

The continuing presence of a large oppressed population throughout the Andean
region amplified the probability of revolt. Subsequent Andean rebellions take on an

almost bipolar character, which:
. . . swings between two idealized extremes: on the one hand there is a turning in upon
itself of Andean culture, and a rejection of the West, and on the other, the
appropriation of the conquerors’ instruments of domination. Both variants can be
traced back to the sixteenth century. . . . What is of interest, however, is that in the
twentieth century the second pole of rebellion predominates: that which seeks to
appropriate for itself the instruments of power of the dominant. . . . (Degregori 1991,
236)
Degregori later postulates that Andeans subsequently developed an intense desire for

education as a way of overcoming this domination. Written language became a method
of social control forced onto the indigenous population through conquest. Thus, “. . .

mastery of the Spanish language, reading and writing . . . [became] the instruments of
domination” (Degregori 1991, 235). Thus, education became a means of taking the

instruments of domination (reading and writing the Spanish language) and using them
against the dominator.7

As students flooded Peru’s universities during the 1960's, many were searching for
an accessible form of the “truth.” During the 1970's, PCP-SL provided this “truth”

7 One could argue that attempts at using the invader’s technology can be seen today in
Sendero’s stealing of dynamite and firearms. The insurgents repeatedly cite the captured weapons
in their propaganda, “. . . a Maoist commando ambushed a police vehicle. . . . The . . . attack was
deadly for the police, four of them were eliminated in the action by submachinegun fire. Before
withdrawing, the guerrillas confiscated four AKM long-range assault rifles” (Arce Borja 1992e, 14).
Similarly, Senderistas urge army conscripts to shoot their officers and desert with their weapons.

9

through its simplified Marxist analysis of Peruvian society (Degregori 1991, 235).
Education by Senderista instructors and militants amounted to ideological
indoctrination in Gonzalo Thought. Senderismo has continued to offer an easily

digestible form of reality in which Andean history is simplified to fit an ideological
conception of reality.

The Revision of History: Insurgent Voices

The coloration of history for propaganda is not unique to SL; however, the movement

appears to take its ideological interpretations more literally than other similar
organizations.

Because of the self-seriousness of Gonzalo Thought, Senderistas

shoehorn reality into a ridged ideological framework. The dogmatic revision of history

provides the guerrillas with a fulcrum for continuing their armed struggle.
According to the propaganda voice of PCP-SL, El Diario International, “(shopping
this war, led by the Communist Party of Peru, is a political and military objective of the

Peruvian tyranny and the United States government.

To achieve this, they are

using-—like the Spanish conquistadors before them—massive crimes and the

extermination of the population” (Arce Borja 1992b, 5). Similarly, the pro-Sendero

magazine, A World to Win has argued that:

For 500 years the people of Peru have been forced to dig the riches from their own

10

land to hand them over to rich and powerful foreign countries—first Spain, later
Great Britain, and then the US. ... By the early 1970s Peru’s government had
become more and more dependent on the imperialists. . . .
During the same period the Communist Party of Peru (PCP), led by Chairman
Gonzalo, was training and preparing itself politically, ideologically, and
organizationally to wage a Maoist People’s War aimed at overcoming . . .
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. (Committee of the Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement 1995b, 18)

This argument is characteristic of the pro-Sendero genre of literature which presents
armed struggle as the only solution to a valid problem. SL self-importantly ascribes
itself the role as the vanguard of global revolution, overcoming the evils of a history of

capitalist exploitation. This worldview is reflective of Sendero’s totalitarian ideology,

which continues to be the inspiration for numerous acts of political violence.
Sendero Luminoso developed as a revolutionary organization within the context of

Andean history. At the same time, the movement has revised history in an effort to

justify its protracted people’s war. For example, “[t]he history of Peru in this century
. . . is actually a history of domination by imperialism, principally Yankee imperialism,

in league with the Peruvian big bourgeoisie and feudal landlords; this exploitation and

oppression are the cause of the present crisis. .

(Central Committee, Communist

Party of Peru 1986, 49). Militants, supporters and admirers all rationalize the use of
terror as a means of political expression. Violence becomes an end in itself, with some

Senderistas undoubtedly enjoying the empowerment which accompanies the use of
force. Far more than a political party, Sendero has become a virtual death cult waging

11

a jihad to purify an iniquitous world.

The Religion of Political Violence
Although PCP-SL claims tliat religion is exploitative of the masses, Senderistas devote

themselves to a party which has several traits in common with ultra-fundamentalist

1

1

!

religions. Indeed, “. . . Sendero exhibits many of the qualities of a religious cult. It

is founded, in a sense, on the revelations of Comrade Gonzalo, has divided the world

sharply between good and evil, maintains a highly rigid belief system, and demands
absolute commitment on the part of its membership” (McCormick 1987, 16-17).
The argument can be made that there is a relation between Sendero’s religious-like

fervor and the elitist origins of tire movement. Lipset argued that “. . . elites of rapidly

developing societies require a political myth which will bind the masses suffering the

dislocations of industrialization and modernization. What religious belief did for the

Western countries . . . 'political religion’ must do for the currently emerging nations”
(Lipset 1968, 208). For Sendero, political religion takes on authoritarian characteristics
that led to a violently simplified worldview. This is confirmable by any examination
of pro-PCP-SL documents, which typically resonate with violent themes and

12

characterizations.8

Senderismo promulgates the words of the infallible President Gonzalo as absolute
truth.

9

The guerrillas violently impose their political ideology/religion on the groups

they claim to represent (i.e. the masses). A problem with this approach is that

.

whenever revolutionaries begin from a thesis that peasants and workers suffer from

false or lowered levels of consciousness, there will be elements of arrogance in their
attempts to effect change” (Wickham-Crowley 1991, 108). PCP-SL views peasants
8 Sendero’s semi-official party newspaper, ElDiario International, has stated “. . . The battle
has already begun. The war of liberation, with . . . the sacrifice of millions of the oppressed, is
advancing. . .” (Arce Borja 1992b, 4, 5). For other examples of Sendero’s attitude towards violence
one can acquire El Diario International from the publisher (a pro-PCP-SL Peruvian in exile) in
Brussels, Belgium. Another interesting source, fairly easily acquired from Revolution Books in New
York City, is the Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement’s A World to Win,
which reprints many PCP-SL documents in English. The Revolutionary Communist Party-USA’s
Revolutionary Worker and The Bulletin of the International Emergency Committee to Defend the
Life of Dr. Abimael Guzman are available from Revolution Books as well. Interestingly, conflicts
have arisen between these publications and the pro-Sendero The New Flag, published by the
Movimiento Popular Peru (MPP) in New York City. The MPP has stated that “. . . the RCP/Co-RIM
[Revolutionary Communist Party-USA, and Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist
Movement] throws up a smokescreen by claiming that President Gonzalo’s views on the People’s
War and World Revolution are unknown. This political position is consistent with its decision to
censor all PCP documents published after August 1992 in its ‘Revolution Books’ stores and outlets”
(Peru People’s Movement 1996a, 38). The MPP operates an Internet site on the World Wide Web
( http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp) which offers a range of Sendero propaganda.

9 SL’s political religion is typified by the intense personality cult which has formed around
Guzman. Unlike Lenin or Mao, Guzman’s cult of personality developed before a successful
revolution. An example of the reverence which was ascribed to Chairman Gonzalo is found in party
documents. “The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru fervently greets our beloved,
heroic and magisterial leader, Chairman Gonzalo; the greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, great
political and military strategist, philosopher, teacher of communists, center of party unification, who
creatively applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions of the Peruvian revolution
has generated Gonzalo Thought, guarantee of the revolutions [s/c] triumph” (Central Committee,
Communist Party of Peru 1992, 1).

13

and workers as clay to be molded in the party image by the “scientific ideology” of

“Gonzalo Thought Marxism”:
If we start from this expressed need to have a guide from outside, it becomes clear
why a university professor should emerge as the leader of SL. The moral stand of SL
is also more understandable, as exemplified by their punishment of adulterers and
drunkards. And it explains why manuals of Marxism were so popular in Peruvian
universities in the 1970s. Students were . . . presented with a simplified and therefore
more accessible version of a theory—that of Marxism—Leninism—which claimed to
be the only “scientific truth,” legitimated by references to the classics of Marxism, its
source of authority. This ‘scientific’ theory proclaimed a new, but strictly
hierarchical, order which they, on joining the party and its truth, could pass from the
bottom to the pinnacle of the social pyramid of knowledge, for we must not forget
that they were university students. (Degregori 1991, 239)

Sendero’s ideology presents itself as an accessible form of absolute truth. Life for the

believer is simplified into clear instructions, “. . . those who are already waging

people’s war should develop it more . . . and through this process we will demolish

imperialist domination, the domination of reaction. And we will wipe them off the face
of tire earth” (Guzman 1988, 53). It is apparent that these views have perpetuated the

armed struggle.
Sendero Luminoso’s cult-like worship of violence as a means for overcoming
oppression is derived from the “scientific ideology of Gonzalo Thought.” In an effort

to mold reality around ideology, destruction of that which does not conform to party
dogma becomes necessary. Because Peruvian society is infinitely more complicated

than Senderismo, a high level of violence has been applied by the insurgents.

I

i
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Chapter Summary
The attraction of Sendero’s ideology to those with unfulfilled aspirations involves many
complex historical reasons.

An amalgamation of these factors appears to have

contributed to the development of SL. Among these are the colonial experience,
Pern’s cultural dualism, and the history of Andean insurrection. Trying to further its

political ideology, Sendero propaganda has oversimplified Andean history. This is
characteristic of “Gonzalo Thought,” which presents itself as a religious-like ideology
with a monopoly on “truth.” The political religion of SL offered a concrete solution for

those who perceive frustrations in their upward mobility, the “universal law of
violence.” Still, why are some individuals attracted to political violence while others

pursue less destructive solutions? To answer this question, the next chapter will
examine political theory in the Peruvian context.

I
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Chapter II
Theoretical Analysis of the Developmental History of Senderismo

Political theory contributes a plethora of works relevant to any investigation of Sendero

Luminoso. Thus, this chapter examines a diverse cross section of theoretical works to

provide a balanced view of the developmental history of Senderismo. Nevertheless,

not every relevant theory is discussed in this section. Instead, a sample of the literature

is linked with Peruvian reality to explore the evolution of PCP-SL as a contemporary

revolutionary movement.

Because this essay concentrates on the concept of

aspirational deprivation, a good starting point is found in the writings of political
scientist Ted Gurr.

Ted Gurr and Relative Deprivation

Succinctly, Gurr asserts that relative deprivation that touches both elite aspirants and

the masses is likely to produce political violence. Gurr’s argument

. . is derived from

psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived
deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which
aggression is an inherently satisfying response” (Gurr 1972, 185).1

Gurr goes on to

1 It is useful to remember that violence is satisfying to a minority of individuals. “Not that
terrorist violence is inherently appealing to Peruvians. On the contrary, such attacks have been made
not only on state property or private luxury facilities frequented by elites, but also on movie theaters

=
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postulate that

. the primary causal sequence in political violence is first the

development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its
actualization in violent action against political objects and actors” (Gurr 1970, 12-13).

Glut’s work is applicable to Sendero in a number of ways. A study by the
respected Institute de Estudios Peruanos found that those convicted for armed

subversion exhibited certain similar characteristics. The prototypical Senderista’s
“. . . achievement in the formation of technical and professional [skills] is discrepant

with his or her precarious economic situation; which results in economic and
occupational marginality [Trans.]” (Chavez de Paz 1989, 16).2 The inconsistency

between aspirations and reality leads to the development of discontent.
In many ways, Gurr’s work is in concordance with the view that the greater “. . .
discrepancy between a person’s goals or desired level of achievement and his actual

level of achievement the greater the achievement discrepancy, [and] the greater the
potential for political violence. This Achievement Discrepancy (AD) hypothesis has

and similar establishments visited by average citizens” (Kay 1989, 56). Regardless, the individuals
who do find violence satisfying are highly committed to their beliefs and capable of justifying attacks
against “reactionary” institutions. Gonzalo Thought rationalizes the most brutal assassinations. For
example, the party’s semi-official newspaper, El Diario International boasted that “Maoist forces
have executed three priests. . . . Italian priest Alessandro Dordi was found riddled with bullets” (Arce
Borja 1991, 3).
2 When I spoke with Carlos Ivan Degregori’s assistant, Juan Carlos Guerrero in Lima, he
noted that this work uses less than reliable Peruvian Government statistics (Guerrero 1996).
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been labeled variously, ‘relative deprivation,’ ‘systematic frustration,’ [and] ‘/curve.
. .’” (Grofinan and Muller 1973, 514). Concordantly, of those convicted of terrorism

J

in Peru, 29.5 percent had attended a university, compared with 2.5 percent of those
convicted of assault and robbery and 6.6 percent of those convicted of narcotrafficing

(Chavez de Paz 1989, 41). Aspirations have typically been incongruent with the
expectations of many who became Senderistas. “Most ordinary Senderistas are . . .

students and peasants, mostly from Andean areas. The students realize that, with their

II
'i
]
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poor professional qualifications . . . and Indian backgrounds, they have no hope for a
job fitting their expectations” (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 332). PCP-SL’s party

structure easily politicalized this discontent, eventually encouraging armed actions.

1
i

Gurr asserts that “[t]he fundamental cause of civil strife is deprivation-induced
discontent: the greater the discrepancy between what men believe they deserve and
what they think they are capable of attaining, the greater the discontent” (Gurr and

Graham 1969, 620). On the other hand, Douglas Hibbs argues that “. . . the imbalance

of education and economic development appears to have little value for explaining
actual variation ... of mass political violence” (Hibbs 1973, 48). At the same time,
Gurr’s work does not fully consider the importance of a well-developed party

organization. One can argue that the discontent of some Peruvians would never have
translated into action without Sendero’s exceptional political organization. To explain

i

1
■

18

this component of Sendero’s growth, we need to examine a work which considers the
role of organization in political violence.

Charles Tilly and PCP-SL Party Organization

In contrast to Gurr, Tilly argues that even intensive discontent cannot translate into

political violence without some level of organization. Tilly says “. . . that revolutions
. . . tend to flow directly out of a population’s central political processes, instead of

expressing diffuse strains and discontents of the population; . . . claims and
counterclaims . . . made on the existing government by various mobilized groups are

more important than the general satisfaction or discontent of those groups. .

(Tilly

1973, 436). We can easily apply Tilly’s work to PCP-SL’s approach to revolution:
Although the appalling economic conditions and the increasing restrictions mentioned
by Sendero are both real, hunger in itself has never been sufficient to create a
revolutionary consciousness or a revolutionary situation. When pressed on this point
Sendero falls back on the voluntaristic Guevarist maxim that even if all the conditions
are not ripe for launching of armed struggle, the struggle itself will create them.
(Taylor 1983, 24)

Sendero Luminoso’s party organization has been vital to the movement’s growth.
Without a lens to focus the discontent of certain groups, there would be no prolonged

insurgency. Yet, a combination of other political, social and historical factors have
contributed to the growth of PCP-SL.

In this context, one must consider

socioeconomic reality, modernization, and the contribution of revolutionary
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intellectuals in the development and attraction of Sendero.

Samuel Huntington, Peruvian Reality and the Appeal of PCP-SL

In his cross-national comparative study of democracy, political scientist Samuel
■

Huntington linked Sendero’s insurgency with severe socioeconomic inequality,
extensive state involvement in the economy, and foreign debt as “. . . major contextual
problems. . .” (Huntington 1993, 254). Huntington’s Political Order in Changing

Societies looks at the effects of modernization on revolutionary activities; he believes
that:
The revolutionary intellectual is a virtually universal phenomena in modernizing
societies. . . . The ability of the intellectuals to carry out a revolutionary role depends
upon their relations with other social groups. Initially they are likely to be the
dominant middle-class group; their ability to instigate a revolution at this time depends
upon their ability to arouse mass support from other elements in the population, such
as the peasants. . . . The role of the dominant groups in the countryside hence
becomes the critical factor determining the stability or fragility of the government.
(Huntington 1969, 290-291)

Huntington’s theory can be superimposed onto Peruvian reality in a number of ways.

For example, the notion of the revolutionary intellectual can be applied to Dr. Abimael

Guzman.3 This view was supported during a telephone interview with David Scott

3 Another notable Senderista filling this description was Janet Talevara, who is credited along
with Luis Arce Borja in the 1988 interview of Abimael Guzman. Following her death in a prison
uprising in 1992, El Diario International noted that “[t]he assistant editor of El Diario was, without
a doubt, a revolutionary intellectual” (Arce Boija 1992d, 9).

I
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Palmer,4 who described his experience of sharing an office with Dr. Guzman at the

Universidad National San Cristobal de Huamanga (UNSCH) in the early sixties:
He was considered to be a good professor, he taught philosophy in the education
program. The University had roughly 400 students. It was a pluralistic place. . . .
I never saw him as the leader of a people’s war. The thing that did it was his time in
China during the cultural revolution. Mao’s line lost to Deng’s, and Guzman thought
that the only thing to do was to start an insurgency in Peru. (Palmer 1996)

Before beginning its armed struggle, PCP-SL concentrated on party building among the

impoverished Indians and mestizos of Ayacucho and other provinces. This was made
easier by the University of Humanga’s unique outreach program that PCP-SL used to
build its presence in rural peasant communities. However, “Sendero is derived from

the university, not from the peasantry. This means that its perspective on the armed

struggle is fundamentally intellectual and ideological rather than practical and
developmental” (Palmer 1994, 262).

Thus, a considerable portion of the most

committed Senderistas come from a university environment.

Peasants and intellectuals play a key role in Huntington’s views on developing a
successful revolution. Yet, it is the peasantry which makes up the backbone of a
successful revolution:

4 David Scott Palmer is professor of international relations and political science at Boston
University and director of the Latin American Studies Program there. He was a Peace Corps
volunteer at the University of Humanga where he shared an office with Abimael Guzman for a year.
He has written several books on Peru, including Peru the Authoritarian Tradition, Shining Path of
Peru and several influential journal articles on SL.
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Efforts by intellectuals to arouse peasants almost invariably fail unless the social and
economic conditions of the peasantry are such as to give them concrete motives for
revolt. The intelligentsia can ally themselves with a revolutionary peasantry but they
can not create a revolutionary peasantry. ... [In China] Mao and those who followed
him, acting on Mao’s own observation of the revolutionary character of the peasantry,
moved out to reconstitute the Communist movement in the countryside after their
defeat in the cities. At that point, for the first time in history, the peasant uprising
which accompanies every revolution became organized, disciplined, and led by a
group of highly conscious and articulate professional revolutionary intellectuals.
(Huntington 1968, 303)

Huntington’s view of the importance of the peasantry can be viewed through the

Maoist lens of the PCP-SL’s protracted people’s war:
[T]aking the concrete conditions of the country into account, the . . . [Party]
sanctioned the “Outline of the Armed Struggle.” In essence this plan held that
people’s war in Peru must develop as a single revolutionary war in the countryside
and cities, with the countryside the principal theater of armed actions, following the
road of surrounding the cities from the countryside. (Central Committee, Communist
Party of Peru 1986, 19-20)

The PCP-SL has adapted Mao to fit the Peru’s urban reality, while Sendero

. self

consciously retained its original rural orientation, the cities have played an increasing,
contributory role in Shining Path planning” (McCormick 1992, 2). Huntington could

not have foreseen the importance of an urban guerrilla campaign in Lima; however,
“[t]he Shining Path’s campaign within the capital has been and will continue to be

guided by the movement’s larger rural-based theory of victory” (McCormick 1992,
22).5 In this context, the PCP-SL is close to Huntington’s belief in the importance of

5 U.S. intelligence from the 1980’s confirms Sendero’s urban trend. “Police arrested 13
guerrillas in Peru Friday [in January 1987?] after numerous bombs exploded throughout Lima . . .
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rural groups, especially peasants.
Huntington believes that a history of “. . . [c]olonialism and ethnic heterogeneity

would seem to be much better predictors of violence than poverty [alone]” (Huntington
1969, 42). This corresponds with Peru’s history of colonialism and atavistic racial
divisions, characterized by “. . . discrimination by Peru’s whites against . . . dark

skinned individuals . . . [which] became channeled into support for the Shining Path”

(McClintock 1993, 222). Sendero has drawn from the misery of the masses in the
formation of its guerrilla war. The unrealized expectations which accompanied Peru’s

failed agrarian reforms have played an especially important role for SL.

Revolution and the Failure of Peru’s Agrarian Reforms

Many of Pern’s rural poor experienced rising expectations during the country’s land
reforms of the 1960's, only to realize subsequently the inappropriateness of these

programs. The frustration and displacement which accompanied these land reforms
were a decisive factor in the attraction of subsequent armed subversion. To understand
the reasons for the implementation, and failures of these government policies, one must

with several destroying power facilities and blacking out electricity for more than half the population
of Peru. Press reports that one bomb went off in front of the National Penitentiary, not far from the
U.S. Embassy. These attacks reflect the continued emphasis of Sendero Luminoso terrorists on urban
violence in an attempt to embarrass the government” (Central Intelligence Agency 1987, 1).
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consider the relations between dominant-classes and the state.

Political scientist Theda Skocpol’s neo-Marxist approach to revolution is presented
in her highly influential work States and Social Revolutions. Her thesis is that the

state’s interests can conflict with the dominant-class when the state perceives the
necessity of pacifying the masses at the expense of the upper-class; indeed:
. . the use of state power to support dominant class interests is not inevitable.
Indeed, attempts of state rulers merely to perform the state’s “own” functions may
create conflicts of interest with the dominant class. . . . [T]he state has its own
distinct interests vis-a-vis the subordinate classes. Although both the state and the
dominant class(es) share a broad interest in keeping the subordinate class in place in
society and at work in the existing economy, the state’s own fundamental interest in
maintaining sheer physical order and political peace may lead it—especially in periods
of crisis-—to enforce concessions to subordinate-class demands. (Skocpol 1993, 30)

Skocpol’s thesis can be juxtaposed onto Peru’s insurgents of the 1960's and the land
reforms of General Juan Velasco’s “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces”

(1968-1975).

Under this government, the state overlooked the interests of the

dominant-class (i.e., large land owners) in an effort to pacify the masses. At the same
time, Velasco’s reforms raised aspirations which the regime did not fulfill.

Before Velasco’s reforms, insurgents of the Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario

(FIR)6 played on the fact that “. . . Pern was deeply divided economically, particularly

6 The FIR was a Trotskyist party active primarily in the department of Cusco from 19591963, “Blanco opposed the idea that revolutionary nuclei (/ocas') were capable of carrying out a
revolution. He maintained instead that the FIR shares the Trotskyite views on revolutionary violence
and stressed the need for a worker-peasant alliance. Blanco assumed in 1962 that political agitation
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in rural areas. . . . [Revolutionaries] were therefore motivated by their desire to
overthrow the established order and impose a socialist regime” (Radu and Tismaneanu
1990, 310). Velasco was aware that regimes which do not undertake reforms to

diminish the privileges of dominant classes are often unable to undertake the reforms
necessary to prevent a revolution. This is illustrated in Velasco’s 1968 description of
his “. . . adversaries and detractors. They . . . come from a privileged group of political
elites and economic monopolies. This is the traditional oligarchy, which will see its
antipatriotic dominance of Peru in jeopardy” (Velasco 1995, 268). In many ways,

pressures exerted by the masses motivated the leftist military government to make
reforms that benefited the regime at the expense of the dominant social class.

Velasco’s reforms

. unleashed growing conflict. . . . Sharp increases in labor

and peasant strikes ... led by radical Maoist unions, increased social tensions and were
a clear demonstration that the military’s mobilization of lower-class sectors had not
resulted in the hoped for creation of a support base for the regime” (Mauceri 1991, 86).

would encourage the peasants to claim the land; this in turn would lead to armed struggle. Criticizing
Guevara’s foco theory, he pointed out main weaknesses in Castroism. As he viewed it, Castroism
underestimated the importance of‘isolated heroic acts’” (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 309-310).
During the 1960's, the FIR, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) (formed by a rebel
Aprista), and the Ejercito de Liberation National (ELN) “. . . were short lived, reflecting a fatal
miscalculation by these mostly light-skinned intellectuals, who wrongly assumed that peasants and
Indians would rally around them to overthrow the old order” (Starn, Degregori and Kirk 1995, 293).
Interestingly, Blanco went on to become a candidate for the Presidency of Peru in 1980, winning 3.9
percent of the vote (Gorriti 1990, 37).
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Regardless, Velasco’s reforms did delay revolutionary actions, ‘beginning reforms in
the country and the city significantly delayed the possibilities of new action against the
system [Trans.]’ (Mercado 1982, 8). Still, the unfulfilled expectations of the Velasco

era led to a certain receptivity to radical ideas. At the same time, the experience of the
foco guerrillas of the 1960's provided a lesson to those who wish to launch armed

actions against the Peruvian State.

The Guerrillas of the 1960’s and the Development of Senderismo

The inadequacy of Peru’s foco style movements of the 1960's led potential

revolutionaries to question the tactics and ideology used by these guerrillas. Thus,

while Sendero was still in its formative stages it learned from the mistakes of the foco
movements. Consequently, an understanding of the foco theory is necessary to begin

to comprehend Sendero Luminoso.
The foco theory is typically associated with the Cuban-Argentine revolutionary Dr.

Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Che believed that the guerrillas were the focus of the

revolution. This differs from Leninist theory which stressed a “revolutionary situation,”

and the need for “. . . the broadest political agitation, and consequently the organization
of all-sided political exposure, is an absolutely necessary, and the most urgently

necessary. . .” (Lenin 1978, 97-98). On the other hand, Guevara asserted that:

I

26

The guerrilla is the combat vanguard of the people, situated in a specified place in a
certain region, armed and willing to carry out a series of warlike actions for the one
possible strategic end—the seizure of power. . . . We consider that the Cuban
Revolution made . . . fundamental contributions to the laws of the revolutionary
movement in the current situation in America. First, people’s forces can win a war
against the army. Second, one need not always wait for all conditions favorable to
revolution to be present; the insurrection itself can create them. (Guevara 1969, 90)
Thus, Guevarism’s central tenant is that “[t]he actions and motivations of a handful of

individuals, completely unrepresentative of the majority of the population, are thus
considered to be sufficient causes for bringing about a revolution” (Radu and
Tismaneanu 1990, 45). However, many Leninists

. disagree with . . . [Guevara]

on its being possible to . . . [initiate revolution] through the actions of a small group that
decides in a selected country that it will precipitate a Vietnam [style conflict] there”
(Hansen 1989, 65).7

While Guevara concentrated on the spontaneity of revolution, PCP-SL slowly

developed its political support before the initiation of the armed struggle. Sendero
learned from the failures of MIR, ELN and “Che” Guevara that revolution requires
more than a band of armed guerillas wandering the countryside.8 Intense pre-armed

7 As early as the 1920's, Jose Carlos Mariategui discussed the problem of imagining “. . . that
a feeling of nationalism will develop . . . similar to the kind that was a factor in the anti-imperialist
struggles in Asian nations subjugated by imperialism . . .” ( Mariategui 1995, 231).

8 In a sense,
. . Sendero implicitly accepts certain Castroite rural warfare premises,
including the replacement of the party with the guerrilla nucleus. However, this acceptance should
not be construed as an indication of Sendero’s willingness to mitigate what it considers ‘true’ Maoist
theory and practice” (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 327).
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struggle party-building activities have been a hallmark of SL:
[W]hen Sendero’s founder and leader, Abimael Guzman Reynoso . . . began planning
for a revolutionary takeover of Peru in 1971, he allocated nine years for secret,
underground mobilization before the start of the revolutionary war. Indeed, Sendero
only began its vicious campaign of violence in 1980, according to a plan rather than
in reaction to changing Peruvian realities. (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 11)

In contrast to Guevarism, and similar to Leninist theories, Sendero does not attempt to
produce a revolutionary situation by itself. According to party ideology, PCP-SL began

its war by “. . . taking the concrete conditions of the country into account. . .” (Central

Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1986, 19).
Guevarism views the “. . . the peasantry . . . [as] a class, which because of the

ignorance in which it has been kept. . . cannot alone launch the struggle and achieve

victory” (Guevara 1969, 91). Contrastingly, in the PCP-SL’s ideological conception
of protracted people’s war “[t]he peasantry, especially the poor peasants, are the main

participants, as fighters and commanders at different levels in the People’s Guerrilla

Army. The workers participate in the same ways, although the percentage of workers
at this time [1988] is insufficient” (Guzman 1988, 21).

While Guevara’s theories were applicable to prerevolutionary Cuba, their
juxtaposition onto other regions often had less than the desired effect.9 In Peru, the
9 Throughout the world, “[t]he Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative
revolutionary attempts patterned on it, principally in Latin America and Africa. They all failed. This
does not discredit the foco theory; it does emphasize the importance of a particular set of
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unreceptiveness of the indigenous Quechua and Aymara speaking mountain populations

to the mostly Castellano speaking coastal guerrillas of the 1960's made forming mass
support much different than in Cuba.10

Contrastingly, Sendero spent years

indoctrinating peasants with its Maoist ideology. The message which Sendero has

delivered is one of equality, with a vision for an ultra-egalitarian utopian world in the
distant future. In this context, the issue of inequality in Peruvian society has taken on

profound importance.

Inequality and Political Violence
When discussing inequality, an especially good starting point is found in Manus

Midlarsky’s concept of “patterned inequality.” This theory, which analyses the

relations between social classes, is especially relevant for an investigation of
aspirational deprivation and Sendero Luminoso.
Midlarsky hypothesized that, “[i]f the absence of identification along with continued

emiseration of the population relative to the ruling sector continues for long, then largecircumstances to this model. Legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The/oco
must mature at the same time as the government looses legitimacy, and before any alternative
appears” (U.S. Department of the Army and the Air Force 1990, 2-6).

10 This is similar to the problem Guevara encountered in Bolivia with Indians who were
suspicious of outsiders and saw no reason to join the armed struggle. For Guevara this was one of
the contributing factors which led to his death at the hands of the U.S. supported Bolivian
Government.
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scale political violence becomes more likely” (Midlarsky 1988, 493). Similarly, he has
observed that

. in Peru, there is an ongoing rural guerrilla insurrection suggested in

part by . . . patterned inequality . . . wherein Peru is found in the highest inequality

category, perhaps not sufficiently equalized by the later redistributive policies”
(Midlarsky 1988, 504).

Gonzalo Thought takes advantage of this inequality by

promising an equitable distribution of resources.11 The “Glorious People’s War” would
not have achieved such a high level of effectiveness without being able to feed off the

aspirational deprivation of some Peruvians. Concordantly, Midlarsky asserts that the:
. . . theory of patterned inequality between rulers and ruled provides a valuable
analytic approach to the relationship between inequality and political violence. Under
conditions of a bifurcated pattern of inequality, the probability of political violence is
likely to be greater than under a more generalized inequality typically measured by the
Gini index. A strong systematic relationship between patterned inequality in Latin
American landholding and deaths from political violence was discovered. . . . This
degree of association was far stronger than that found between the Gini index of land
inequality in Latin America and deaths from political violence. (Midlarsky 1988, 491)

Even the casual observer can attest to the profound inequality which is readily apparent
in Peru. Yet, many other nations have inequality as great as or greater than Peru, but
do not experience intensive political violence. Here a weakness of Midlarsky’s thesis

becomes apparent. Why should revolution occur in Pern and not in other countries with

11 Sendero often recruits “. . . a cross section of Peru’s dispossessed, from poor highland
peasants to the large mass of urban unemployed” (McCormick 1990, 11). However, it is in educated,
single, young people that the movement has achieved a significant level of support [Trans.] (Chavez
de Paz 1989, 56).
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the same level of inequity?

In Peru, a highly organized political party stood ready to take advantage of popular
discontent and channel it toward violent activities. This combination of inequality with

a disciplined political party helps to explain Sendero’s rise as a movement. Assertions
that misery automatically translates into collective violence fail to consider the

significance of organized political parties. These organizations can use ideology to take
advantage of misery in the furtherance of a political agenda.

Revolutionary Ideology, State and Political Violence

Ideology is an important and often overlooked component of revolutionary movements.
Seymour Martin Lipset has argued that “. . . extreme ideologies initially emerged with
the rise of new strata ... as they sought their rights of citizenship, that is, the right fully

to participate socially and politically. As long as they were denied such rights sizable

segments of these strata endorsed revolutionary ideologies” (Lipset 1968, 214).

Following Lipset’s thesis, the ideological extremity of Gonzalo Thought could be
linked to the disenfranchisement of segments of the population (i.e., underemployed
university graduates, impoverished Indians, disgruntled intellectuals, etc.).

Much of Peru’s aspiring middle-class has not found that reality matches its
expectations. Senderismo emerged as Pern’s aspiring elites found their personal goals

1
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virtually unachieveable.

Similarly, many terrorists see their opportunities for

participation in the country’s conventional political system as minimal. A number of
guerrillas were undoubtedly attracted to a movement which promises upward mobility,
power and a chance to succeed. In this context, political violence has become a vehicle

of personal empowerment.

Chapter Summary
Do any of the political theories examined in this chapter adequately explain the
ideological attraction of SL?

While Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation appears

applicable to Peru, it does not address the importance of party structure. On the other
hand, Charles Tilly’s emphasis on the importance of party structure appears somewhat
valid, yet a myriad of other social and political factors merit examination. For example,

Samuel Huntington linked several factors in modernizing societies which lead to
political violence. Similarly, Theda Skocpol’s model of the relations between dominant

classes and governments has some applicability in relation to Peru’s agrarian reforms.

These reforms were sparked, in part by Pern’s foco style guerrillas of the 1960's. At
the same time, Manis Midlarsky’s concept of “patterned inequality” partially explains
the role of revolutionary ideology in political violence.

None of the theories examined in this work appear to provide an explanation for
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every aspect of the ideological attraction of SL. While theory is certainly relevant, the

realities of Peru’s equity (or the lack of it) merit extensive discussion. Consequently,

the next chapter defines the relationships between aspirational deprivation and support
for Sendero Luminoso.

33

Chapter III

Incongruent Aspirations and Achievements

The discrepancy between aspirations and achievements in Peru has been a decisive
factor in the growth of PCP-SL as an armed movement. Anger arising from unfulfilled

expectations has translated into violence through a party and ideology which capitalizes
on these sentiments.

Indeed, Peruvian “. . . subversion . . . arises from social

motivations . . . and constitutes a fonn of especially violent reaction by specific sectors

[of the population] intent on undermining the foundations of. . . the state [Trans.]
(Chavez de Paz 1989, 12). To understand the role played by these social motivations,

one must examine the distribution of resources in Peruvian society.

Equity and Revolutionary Appeal
Although Senderismo focuses on social class, typically defining Peru as “semi-feudal,”
it would not have achieved such spectacular success (by the standards of insurgencies)

without the appeal of its ideological egalitarianism. Indeed, the movement has typically

fed off the chronic inequities of an “Aristocratic Republic.”
Among Andean scholars, “. . . there is a broad consensus that ethnic cleavage has
been one of the factors in . . . [Sendero’s] rebellion” (McClintock 1993, 219).
Profound inequality in the distribution of resources based on racial characteristics
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(among other factors), is clearly visible in Peru. This can be linked to theoretical works

“[f]rom Aristotle to Marx and Tocqueville, . . . [which viewed the] nexus between

inequality and political violence [as] strong and direct, with little quibbling as to the
ultimate outcome—in most cases revolution” (Midlarsky 1988, 491-492).1
It is important to remember that there is no evidence which suggests that inequality

automatically transfers into political action. Any examination of Third-World countries

will find many with the same economic and social problems as Peru, but without
concordant levels of political violence.

Sendero’s development results from the

combination of Pern’s lack of equity with a party organization capable of taking

advantage of the angst of Peru’s marginalized classes. This marginality is often
demarcated along ethnic lines.2 However, it is through the Peruvian economic structure
that we find the greatest actualization of inequality.

Economic Angst
The failure of the Peruvian economy to provide adequate employment and wages has

1 Most scholars and U.S. Government analysis concur on Sendero’s high level of violence.
The guerrillas have been “. . . implicated in the slaughters of uncooperative peasants and murders of
village officials. . .” (Central Intelligence Agency 1984, 40).
2 Peru’s ethnic polarization was illustrated “. . . in the early 1940s, [when] President Manuel
Prado considered a curious proposal for ‘improving the race’ which involved encouraging the
migration of Scandinavians to the country’s cities” (de Soto 1989, 10).
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been an important factor in the attraction of Sendero as a revolutionary movement.3

A study funded in part by the Ford Foundation found that 29 percent of convicted

terrorists had no income [Trans.] (Chavez de Paz 1989, 53). Even those who do find
employment Peru must confront a highly problematic economy:
Inflation in 1989 reached a record 2,775 percent, and nearly triple that figure in 1990
at 7,650 percent. Conservative estimates indicate that cumulative inflation during
Alan Garcia’s five years in office was 1 million percent! In January [1991] . . . the
minimum, legal monthly wage was raised more than 50 percent to the equivalent of
76 U.S. dollars. Inflation since then, however, has increased between 6 and 9 percent
a month. Government statistics show GDP declined by 13.6 percent in 1989 and fell
another 6 percent in 1990.
Terrorist incidents have kept pace with the deteriorating economy. Deaths owing
to the violence reached alarming levels last year. . . . And if “pobre Peru” has not
been beaten enough while lying prostrate, a cholera epidemic hit in January and has
caused the deaths of 1,300 people and untold economic loss. (Saba 1993, 35)

More recently, President Fujimori’s economic austerity measures, known as

“Fujishock,” have had mixed economic results. Peru’s inflation rate for March 1996
was only 1.38 percent with a yearly projected rate of 9 or 10 percent [Trans.] (DESCO

1996b). Simultaneously, funds have been diverted from some government programs
to service Peru’s considerable foreign debt.

3 Indeed, “[i]n the 1980s the already severely impoverished departments of. . . [Peru] were
hit hard by the most serious national economic crisis in a century. Wages fell, inflation rates spiraled,
and 60 percent or more of the nation’s industrial capacity was idled. Therefore, the traditional escape
route for peasants as urban wage laborers was closed. In addition, peasants suffered a crisis of
subsistence in the countryside; potato production in the southern Andes fell by 40 to 50 percent. This
crisis followed years of rising peasant expectations to the promises of government reforms.
Nevertheless, the state continued to be unresponsive (Palmer 1994, 82).”
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Peru’s economic conditions have limited the upward mobility of many talented
people.

An effect of this is underemployment and unemployment.

In these

circumstances, people are sometimes attracted to revolutionary movements. At the

same time, the economic policies implemented by the Peruvian Government have less

than their desired effect.

Government Unresponsiveness, Aggression and the Other Path
How should the Peruvian Government remedy the economic conditions which breed

terrorism?

Peruvian entrepreneur, and President of the Institute Libertad y

Democracia, Hernando de Soto4 proposes that “[t]he real remedy for violence and
poverty is to recognize the property and labor of those whom . . . [the Government]
formality today excludes. . . . When people develop a taste for independence . . . they

4 De Soto comes from an atypical Peruvian background. “He completed his post graduate
studies at the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes in Geneva, Switzerland. He has worked as an
economist for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as managing director of one of
Europe’s leading firms of consulting engineers, and as a director of Peru’s Central Reserve Bank.
He is currently chairman of a Peruvian mining firm. . .” (de Soto 1989, 272). De Soto has been
politically active as “. . . Fujimori’s diplomatic advisor. . .[he] was put in charge of drug policy in
Peru. . . . But he finally reached real power as Fujimori’s link to the U.S. administration as well as
international polite society. Fujimori and his Cambio 90 people needed advice on all sorts of things,
like not wearing white socks with black shoes. ... He began to loose influence and in January
[1992], was finally forced to break with Fujimori in a bitter letter” (Kerr 1992, 20). Perhaps de
Soto’s political activity led the pro-Sendero newspaper El Diario International to boast that “. . .
a car bomb armed with 500 kilos of dynamite completely destroyed the offices of the Freedom and
Democracy Institute . . . headed by U.S. agent Hernando de Soto” (ArceBoija 1992c, 7).
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will be able to believe in themselves and in economic freedom” (de Soto 1989, 258).
De Soto concentrates on the role excessive government has on retarding the

prosperity of Peruvians. In his influential book, El Otro Sendero (The Other Path),5

de Soto links frustration with aggression in Peruvian society:
The poorest and most discontented members of the population are not prepared to
accept a society in which opportunities, property, and power are distributed
arbitrarily. People realize that the country’s legal institutions do not allow them to
fulfill rational expectations or afford them minimum facilities and protection. The
frustration engendered can easily result in violence, either in complicity or relative
indifference to it. After all, if the main reason for the existence of legal institutions is
to protect individual rights and property from third parties, permit orderly access to
productive activity, and facilitate harmonious interaction with other individuals, it is
understandable that, when people are discriminated against, many will rebel, (de Soto
1989, 233-234)

The initiation of the reforms suggested by de Soto would probably ameliorate a certain
level of discontent among some people. Nevertheless, the problems of Pern’s economy

are so deep as to make virtually any reforms exceedingly difficult to implement. One
might question whether improvements in Pera’s economy6 would pacify subversives
5 Notably, El Otro Sendero outlined the 207 step bureaucratic process a Peruvian would
need to follow in order to have legal title to land. De Soto argues that this process would take almost
seven years, and discourages Peruvians from obtaining legal title to land from the State.

6 Overall, “Peru's economy continued improving in 1994, achieving a GDP growth of 13
percent (versus 6.5 percent in 1993), the highest growth rate in the world for that year. Inflation has
dropped from 7,650 percent in 1990 to 15.4 percent in 1994 as a result of tight monetary and fiscal
policies. For the first five months of 1995, GDP was up 10 percent compared with the same period
of 1994, and indications suggest overall 1995 growth could exceed 8 percent. The IMF letter of
intent calls for 1995 economic growth of 6-7 percent. The Fujimori Administration hopes to achieve
single-digit inflation in 1995, but if trends for the first five months of the year continue, the result
could be around 12 percent. The IMF letter of intent calls for a CPI increase of 9-11 percent in 1995"
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determined to wage a Maoist People’s War. Yet, SL’s promise of an egalitarian world

in the distant future would certainly lose a considerable amount of its appeal if
substantial reforms were implemented in Peru. In a sense, Sendero’s political power

grows out of poverty and despair. The party claims to act on behalf of Peru’s

oppressed, declaring itself an armed representative of the people.

The “People’s New Democracy”: The Stalinist Tradition
Interestingly, Sendero Luminoso claims to be a democratic organization. In this
context, democracy is defined as the dictatorship of the proletariat, as opposed to the

democracy of the bourgeoisie. In the “People’s Republic of New Democracy,” cares
about personal freedoms and individual rights are rejected for their subversive class
character. Much of the basis for this outlook is found in the Stalinist structure of PCP-

SL as a political party.

Sendero is fundamentally an elitist political entity, and should not be confused with
a popular movement (i.e., peasant revolt). “.. . [T]he Party is not a mass party, though

the Party has a mass character. It has a mass character in the sense that while being a

select organization—a selection of the best, of the proven, of those, as Stalin said, who

(U.S. Department of State 1996, 1). Insurgent propaganda has responded to this economic growth
by declaring that “[a]ll this talk of‘economic recovery’ is but an overinflated balloon about to blow
up” (Peru People’s Movement 1996b, 6).
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have what it takes. . .” (Guzman 1988, 28).7 Guzman’s reference to Stalin is quite
significant:
In the 1970's a body of texts invaded the national universities. These manuals were
on historical materialism, dialectical materialism and political economy. They were
produced for the Soviet Academy of Sciences during the rule of Joseph Stalin.
These texts contributed to the creation of a common sentiment. . . [which viewed]
the social sciences as a closed system of universal truths . . . [and] which appealed to
the “principal of authority” for legitimization. . . . [T]he existence of this common
sentiment contributed to . . . the base for the expansion of the Peruvian Communist
Party, widely known as “Shining Path” [Trans.]. (Degregori 1990, 103)

The Stalinist origins of the manuals of revolution which were popular in Pern during the
PCP-SL’s formative stages should not be forgotten. Before the beginning of the armed
struggle, “. . . the Shining Path had discussed the struggle’s social costs. The essential

tension . . . between philanthropic intention and objectives and brutal means had been
resolved according to Bolshevik and Stalinist tradition” (Gorritti 1995, 317).

Sendero’s Stalinist tendencies can be interpreted as a means for providing the

movement with an ideological order absent in much of Peruvian politics. Although

7 This interview with Abimael Guzman was originally published in the Lima newspaper El
Diario, “[t]wo printings . . . were snapped up by a curious public, but . . . police confiscated all
100,000 copies of the third printing on the slim justification that they didn’t carry the name of the
printer, a requirement that had not previously been enforced. Four days later [the editor] Arce
[Borja] was detained, resulting in protests from the Peruvian Journalist’s Guild. He was released
[over a month later], . .” (Collett 1988, 16). Furthermore, “£/Diario was published during the early
1980's as El Diario de Marka, a daily of the legal left. It was taken over by Sendero in the late
1980's. Degregori told me in May 1991 that he believes that Sendero’s new interest in public
pronouncements had partly to do with the need to compete in Lima with the publicity-minded
insurgency of the MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru)” (Starn 1992, 213).
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individuals may lack economic or career stability, Gonzalo Thought provides the
“scientific ideology” to simplify all issues and provides concrete answers.

Chapter Summary

What role do incongruent aspirations and achievements play in the development of
Sendero Luminoso? Peru’s lack of equity combined with economic angst to make

Senderismo an attractive ideology. At the same time, the Peruvian Government has
complicated matters by inappropriately responding to the needs of the masses. Sendero

has presented itself as a Stalinist-like political entity, capable of imposing order and
discipline.

The factors cited in this chapter have all been enabling mechanisms in Sendero’s

insurgency. Yet, the guerrillas express themselves most directly through violence.
Thus, to understand the connection between aspirational deprivation and the appeal of
Senderismo, one must examine the armed struggle itself.

F
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Chapter IV

Application of Revolutionary Political Violence

Unhampered by the collapse of what it labels “revisionism” in the former Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, PCP-SL considers itself the vanguard of world communist
revolution. Consequently, Sendero Luminoso has had post-cold war appeal by offering

violent political empowerment to a small group of politically alienated individuals.1
This is illustrated in party literature which extols armed struggle as a means of

attaining:
. . . communism, the only unsurpassable new society, without exploited or exploiters,
without oppressed or oppressors, without classes, without a state, without parties .
. . the society of “great harmony,” the radical and definitive new society towards
which 15 billion years of matter in motion—that part of eternal matter which we
know, has been inevitably and irresistibly heading, but only by propelling the class
struggle forward until it reaches the epic heights of people’s war, with guns in the
hands of the armed classes and masses of people, and counter-revolutionary war is
destroyed forever, imperialism and reaction are overthrown and swept off the face of
the earth, and in the shadow of the guns of invincible people’s war . . . society is
transformed in all spheres. . . . (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist
Movement 1987, 13)

For Sendero, all human existence occurs through a party-led people’s war, and its

corresponding Chinese Cultural Revolution style communism. Violence facilitates
Sendero’s utopia, destroying the perceived injustices of capitalism. Death becomes a
1 Political alienation has played an important role in the attraction of Sendero Luminoso’s
armed struggle. As those with unfulfilled expectations failed to find self-expression through
conventional political activities, political alienation has developed. Yet, it is important to note that
“. . . the concept is not alienation in general, but a specifically political variant. . .” (Muller and Jukam
1977, 1561).
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purification ritual where nonbelievers are purged from the “new state” with Khmer
Rouge-like zeal.2 Yet, the “Glorious People’s War” has not been a spontaneous event.

Years of meticulous party building were invested before the beginning of the armed
struggle.

Development of the Mass-Based Insurgency

Sendero has followed many of the organizational doctrines of Maoist mass-based

guerrilla warfare developed in the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionary models.
Succinctly, the mass-based insurrection is characterized by extensive pre-armed
struggle indoctrination of the masses, combined with intensive party development.

Theoretically, this is a difficult revolutionary model to organize, although once
successfully initiated it is extremely difficult to counter.3 Following the U.S. encounter
with the Vietnamese model, American military doctrine declared the mass-based

insurrection:
. . the most sophisticated insurgency in terms of organization and methods of

2 Abimael Guzman has compared Maoist revolution to Beethoven’s “. . . Ninth Symphony
. . . which rises into a crescendo until bursting into a musical explosion. . . . Never before was this
pitch reached, but in this century, after many efforts, what was nearly impossible to attain was finally
achieved. There is nothing that man cannot accomplish!” (Guzman 1980a, 2).
3 This point is resonated in PCP-SL propaganda which quoted Senderologist Gordon
McCormick’s interview with Caretas where he stated “... even with the death of Guzman, SL would
still be the best organized political force in Peru” (Arce Borja 1993, 12).
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operation. It is difficult to organize, but once under way, it has a high probability of
success and is the type of insurgency most likely to require external assistance to
defeat. . . . This type of insurgency originated in China under Mao Tse-Tung. Massoriented insurgency relies on mobilization of very large numbers of people into an
alternative government with many highly specialized political and military agencies.
It bases its mobilization on a clear identification of social dysfunctions and an
appealing program for social change. (U.S. Department of the Army and the Air
force 1990, D-0)

From around 1970 to the 1980 initiation of the armed struggle, Senderistas

indoctrinated a number of Peruvians in Gonzalo thought. After sixteen years of
insurgency, the movement continues to retain an interest in building a mass base. Still,

the guerrillas have failed to persuade large numbers of people to support Senderismo

nationwide. In the areas where Sendero was most active, Ayacucho, Apurimac and
Huancavelica, propaganda attempted to identify Peru’s social dysfunctions.

Subsequently, the guerrillas proclaim the virtues of political violence as a means of
overcoming social inequalities.

Initiation of the Armed Struggle
After years of extensive party building, Sendero commenced its armed struggle on April
19, 1980. The ceremonious initiation of the people’s war occurred as Abimael Guzman
delivered a speech entitled “We Are the Initiators” to graduates of Sendero’s First

Military School:
As Chairman Mao said: “The storm draws near and the wind roars in the tower.
Thus, the vortex draws near, the vortex begins, and the invincible flame of revolution
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grows, converting itself into . . . steel. And from the din of battle along its
inextinguishable fires will come forth the light. From the darkness a light will appear
and a new world will be born. The old order of reaction crackles, its old boat leaks
and sinks in desperation. But comrades, nobody can expect reaction to retire gently.
Marx warned us: Even while drowning, the reactionaries were capable of inflicting
asphyxiating choke holds and desperate blows in order to see us sink. This is
impossible. The reaction has the hyena’s dreams of blood. Convulsive dreams shake
their somber nights. Their hearts scheme sinister hecatombs. They arm themselves
to the teeth but they cannot prevail. Their destiny is weighted and measured. The
time has come for the settling of accounts. (Guzman 1980b, 2)

Guzman’s apocalyptic summons set the stage for the development of an extremely
brutal insurrection in the name of “true” communism. Yet, the idea of a provincial

college professor leading university-based Maoists along the luminescent path of
Mariategui towards an Andean communist utopia, appeared absurd to many Peruvians;4
indeed:
There was, indeed, general scepticism among the rest of the left in 1980, when
Sendero launched a campaign of armed actions in the highland department of
Ayacucho, a full two years after the last of its supporters had disappeared from the
local state university, San Cristobal de Huamanga (UNSCH). The proverbially
sectarian senderistas had finally been vanquished by other left-wing groups within the
university, had lost control of the few mass organizations they had dominated, and
were apparently irrelevant to the development of the left in Peru. . . . Sendero
Luminoso has nevertheless survived, and even expanded beyond the narrow confines

4 Peruvians were not the only ones to underestimate PCP-SL. U.S. intelligence analysis from
this period negates the importance of Sendero. One declassified CIA report, entitled “Keeping
Terrorism in Check,” is typical “. . . recent [terrorist] incidents are not part of a concerted campaign.
Some result from violence traditionally associated with the isolated central highlands; others are the
acts of small, fanatical, extremist-left groups. . . . The most active of these . . . [is] known as the
Shining Path. . . . Despite its announced intention to wage widespread guerrilla warfare, the group
has so far confined its activities primarily to attacking isolated police stations, electricity towers, and
waterworks. The Shining Path . . . continues to rely heavily on dynamite—which is readily available
in Peru’s mining regions—rather than weapons. The police have arrested many of the group s cadre,
further hindering the group’s efforts to expand operations” (Central Intelligence Agency 1981, 2527).
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of the three Andean departments where it launched its ‘protracted people’s war’ in
1980. ... Its appeal, or at least its effectiveness, is clearly greater than it appeared.
. . . (Harding 1988, 65)

What explains SL’s improbable growth as a revolutionary movement? The resiliency
of this guerrilla movement results from a series of complex social, economic and
political factors combined with meticulous party development. One could argue that

violence empowers those who perceive themselves as politically and economically
impotent. In this way, Sendero can address the needs of a significant minority of the
Peruvian population. For some insurgents, the bomb is not only the weapon of the

revolution, but a means of personal gratification for the individual bomb thrower.

Senderismo and the Lucha Armada

PCP-SL’s protracted people’s war is not just about establishing control of the Peruvian
government, but about changing the way people think, their morals, and characters.

Through the lucha armada (armed struggle)5 the guerrillas have zealously attempted

5 Partially because of government ineptitude, the armed struggle developed into an intense
campaign of subversive political violence. “Following Peru’s return to civilian rule in 1980, the SL
launched increasingly violent attacks against various facilities and persons throughout the country,
prompting President Belaunde to declare an emergency zone in SL’s major area of operations and
eventually to authorize military involvement in counterterrorist operations in December 1982. Since
then, despite suffering significant losses, the SL has managed to stage dramatic attacks against police
and military facilities, electrical towers, government ministries, foreign embassies, and various
businesses. The group has also assassinated increasing numbers of local officials and suspected
informants” (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.a, 76).
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to mold reality around ideology. One expression of this is that all political articulation

outside the party is automatically labeled revisionist, or counterrevolutionary.

Because opposing political parties undermine the legitimacy of SL as the vanguard
of social change, their annihilation becomes necessary. Other leftist parties have been
labeled “parliamentary cretins,” while SL has threatened to kill 40 APRA (American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance) members “.. . to mark the seventh anniversary of the

beginning of its armed struggle” (U.S. Department of State 1987, 1). Political violence
becomes the quintessential means for expressing grievances (real or imagined) against
the state.

Peasants who fail to cooperate with the guerrillas, or who fonn ronda self-defense
patrols typically become targets of violence and repression.

Perceptions of

indiscriminate violence by the guerrillas has impeded recruitment among many of
Peru’s poor.

Still, Sendero has been moderately successful at attracting some

disenfranchised groups throughout different regions of the country.6 An important
factor in the continuing draw of SL has been the movement’s ideological promise of
order. This has been actualized through the organizational ideology and doctrines of

6 SL’s attraction has varied in concordance with regional levels of political violence.
“Between 1980 and 1993 deaths attributable to political violence averaged 3.68 per-hundred
inhabitants in Huanta; in Cangallo 2.86 and in La Mar 2.66. ... If the proportion of victims on the
national level had been similar to that of Huanta, there would have been 800,000 Peruvians killed by
political violence during these years [Trans.]" (Degregori 1996, 16).
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guerra popular (popular war, or people’s war).

Organizational Principles

Ideology has dictated many of the organizational doctrines of Sendero Luminoso’s
protracted people’s war.7 Nevertheless, ideology has not impeded the party from acting

pragmatically in situations that benefit the revolutionaries themselves. At the same
time, the guerrillas still remain “ideologically pure” enough to consider themselves

above realpolitik.

The strength of Peru’s Maoist subversives lies beyond conventional military-style
assessments of arms.8 Meticulous social development has provided SL with a level of

effectiveness unrivaled by many contemporary Latin American insurgencies. Sendero

“. . . has sought to work within and ‘on’ society to create an organizational base that
is closely integrated with its constituency” (McCormick 1993, 20). This is in glaring
contrast to the foco styled Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), which

“. . . measures its own strength and that of its adversaries in conventional military terms
7 Party ideology stresses that “[t]he decisive thing is to go to the masses and act together with
them. We base ourselves on our ideology, weapons are not principal. Let ideas arm hands, our
ideology is the arm that will win victory. That is what we have learned from the great teachers of
Marxism” (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 1992, 35).

8 According to computer disks kept by Abimael Guzman, by 1990 Sendero had 23,430
members, but only". . . 300 combat arms, 500 carbines and 235 revolvers [Trans.]” (Caretas 1996a,
38).
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and shows little talent for social organization” (McCormick 1993, 20).9 Sendero’s

emphasis on the importance of social organization is displayed through party
documents. “The armed forces [of PCP-SL] started out as armed detachments without

arms, because as Lenin taught the lack of arms cannot be used as a pretext for not
organizing an armed apparatus. . .” (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru

1986, 33-34).
While ideology has guided much of the fonnation of SL, there are instances of

guerrillas deviating from the luminescent path of Gonzalo Thought. In the coca rich
Alto Huallaga Valle (Upper Huallaga Valley) it is widely believed that Senderistas are
involved with capitalistic narcotrafficers. The guerrillas allow narcotrafficers to operate

in Sendero controlled regions in exchange for a “war tax.” Thus, the quest for world

communism has led an anti-capitalistic movement to profit from a lucrative market
economy.10

9 Like Sendero, MRTA argues that the Peruvian people
. are heirs to a very ancient and
glorious past.’ This past is said to encompass more than four centuries of struggle and national
resistance’ [s/c] spanning the ‘heroic resistance of Manco Inca to the Spanish conquest,’ the ‘glorious
anticolonial struggle of Tupac Amaru in 1780,’ [and] Peru’s struggle for independence. . .”
(McCormick 1993, 8). Recently, MRTA is perhaps most notable to many North Americans because
of the arrest of Lori Berenson, of New York, who was sentenced to 20 to 30 years for collaboration
with MRTA [Trans.] (Caretas 1995a, 30).

10 For a thorough discussion of this see Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano s Sendero Luminoso and
the Threat of Narcoterrorism (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
1990).
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Gonzalo Thought has provided a guideline for the organization and implementation

of Sendero’s insurgency. At the same time, the ideological “purity” of PCP-SL has not
impeded pragmatic dealings to further the people’s war. Yet, for the party to be

successful in its goals, it must effectively channel the frustrations of the masses.

Mass Support
Senderismo boldly proclaims that “the people’s war is a peasant’s war or it is nothing

[Trans.]” (Mercado 1982, 27). Nonetheless, SL’s use of “selective annihilations”11
against peasants has made extensive party building among the masses somewhat

problematic. In the words of Abimael Guzman, “[w]e began to prepare for the
bloodbath in 1981 because it had to come” (Guzman 1988, 45).

Senderista militants often come from the economically frustrated rural middle class.

11 The PCP-SL’s newspeak-like euphemism for murder is “selective annihilation.” This is
demonstrated in El Diario International's coverage of: “September Actions. ... A Maoist
annihilation squad killed two police effectives . . . Juan Moises Ramirez . . . and his chauffeur were
annihilated in a Maoist ambush” (Arce Borja 1992a, 8). The insurgents realize that “[b]y focusing
their attacks on the police . . . the guerrillas can create significant political problems for . . . [the
President] by further souring relations between the President and the police. . .” (Central Intelligence
Agency n.d.b, 1). The insurgents have worked for an “. . . escalation of . . . [the] selective
assassination campaign aimed at police [and] military” (Central Intelligence Agency 1986, 1). While
assassination certainly takes place, there is some question over the degree of selectivity; for example
“. . . a PCP-SL unit attacked the community of Huayllao. ... The massacre resulted in the killing
of 47 peasants, including 14 children aged four to 15 [emphasis in original text] (Amnesty
International 1993, 40). This type of action tends to alienate the masses, thus hindering the guerrillas’
long term effectiveness.
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SL s penetration of several provincial universities facilitated mobilization of this group.
At the same time, Peru s lower class masses have circumvented mobilization by PCP-

SL or government forces. Indeed, many peasants call Senderistas “. . . demons or antiChrists and the armed forces ... as foreign mercenaries or pishtacos [Trans.]”

(Degregori 1996, 19).12

If Sendero’s leadership assumed that widespread misery automatically translates
into a receptivity to radicalism, they have been incorrect in their analysis of Peru’s

revolutionary situation. Sendero Luminoso does not appear to have the support of the

nation’s poor masses.13 Yet, those committed to SL have compensated for their
relatively small numbers by an intense devotion to the revolution. This group of
extremists has managed to provoke a number of inappropriate reactions from
government forces.

12 A pishtaco is mythological Andean vampire-like creature which kills Indians and sells their
fat, often to foreigners, to pay off Peru’s foreign debt. See Raul Gonzalez’s “Ayacucho: Sendero y
pistacos. Shakespeare en Ayacucho,” Quehacer, no. 49 (November-December 1987): 63-66; Raul
Gonzalez, “Ayacucho: de nuevo los degolladores,” Quehacer, no. 49 (November-December 1987):
67-71. (Because Quechua has no written language, Spanish has attempted to approximate Quechua
words using Spanish pronunciations. This seems to be the case with pishtaco and pistaco, both of
which appear to be acceptable spellings).

13 In an effort to escape the violence of the “Glorious Armed Struggle over 570,000
Peruvians have been displaced by political violence (CEPRODEP 1993, 7). Known as desplazados
(displaced ones), many live in desperate poverty, often begging with their children in cities.
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The Peruvian State’s Response
Abuses by the Peruvian military s counterinsurgency have aided the insurgents more

tlian virtually any other government action. Unable to differentiate between Senderistas
and civilians, the military has responded with a campaign of dirty war. Alienated by

government repression, otherwise pacified segments of the population developed a

susceptibility to Senderismo.
SL has pursued a relatively successful campaign of high visibility, low risk

insurrectional activities. The goal is to undennine popular confidence in the state. CIA
analysis confirmed that “. . . attacks ... by the Sendero Luminoso insurgent group

will increase public, military, and opposition criticism of President Belaunde’s handling
of the problem” (Central Intelligence Agency 1983, I).14 This is precisely the desired
effect of the guerrilla’s armed actions.
While the brutality of the security forces has driven some peasants towards SL, the

insurgency has failed to live up to its potential because of its liberal use of violence.

Many of the victims of this violence have not been nefarious imperialists, but the
14 The release date for this information was February 1996, as opposed to 1990 for most
other documents of this period. A possible reason for the belated release this text is its implication
that insurgent attacks were effectively weakening the Peruvian Government. The report went on to
state that “[a]ccording to press reports, the insurgents attacked police headquarters in Ayacucho City
and struck several isolated villages throughout the department. Security forces have increased
patrols, rounded up suspects-including students from Ayacucho s Huamanga University-and
reinforced police units. The press has begun to dispute the government’s claim that it has been
regaining control of Ayacucho Department in recent months” (Central Intelligence Agency 1983, 1).
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masses of Peru’s peasantry. Indeed, “... the first... to be executed (in 1981) were

cattle thieves. . . . However, Sendero . . . met with resistance when its cadres
attempted to assassinate people whose infractions were deemed minor” (Isbell, in
Palmer 1994, 79). Much of Sendero’s propensity towards violence comes from its

Maoist ideological underpinnings. Molding reality to fit its doctrines of social and

political reality, the movement has destroyed that which deviates from Senderismo.

Political Violence and Ideology
One of the most easily overlooked, yet crucial facets of PCP-SL, is its dogmatic

ideology of “Marxism-Leninism-Maoism,” known as Gonzalo Thought. Party founder
Abimael Guzman developed an ideology which romanticizes political violence as the

ultimate expression of proletarian class consciousness.15

A cardinal dictum of

Senderismo is that protracted people’s war is used “[t]o advance the democratic

15 Abimael Guzman claims that “[t]he application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the
concrete conditions of Peruvian society leads to the conclusion that revolutionary violence or violent
revolution, the only way to seize state power and transform the world, must take the form of people’s
war and more specifically a peasant war led by the Communist Party of Peru as the representative of
the proletariat, a war which develops as a single whole waged principally in the countryside and
complementary in the cities, following the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside whose
essence is the establishment of a People’s Republic, a great victory which much be followed by
continuing the revolution through socialism and cultural revolutions, under the dictatorship of the
proletariat with the firm exercise of its class violence, until achieving, together with all humanity,
glorious communism, the realm of true freedom” (Guzman 1988, 14).
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revolution—to overthrow the exploitation and oppression of imperialism (principally
Yankee), bureaucrat capitalism and subsequent semifeudalism—in order to seize state

power for the proletariat and the people. ... A people’s war, in essence a peasant war
led by the Communist Party” (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1986, 1).
The guidance of Gonzalo Thought is actualized through the party’s monopoly on

leadership of the proletarian revolution.
One could argue that Sendero’s claim that it offers the only true path to revolution

is an ideologically effective means for suppressing dissent. The party’s utopian
aspirations are preceded by the need to use violence in a purification ritual which

exterminates capitalistic apostates. Party organization and ideological purity combine
to improve group effectiveness:

Ideology serves a number of important functions for the revolutionary organization.
Perhaps the most significant of these is the role it plays within the organization itself,
both as a guide to action and as an instrument of organizational solidarity. Ideology,
in this sense, is the conceptual counterpart of the central party. It provides a
benchmark for determining the “correct” political line and an objective aid in forging
a common position within the group. In the absence of a central party, a common,
clearly articulated ideological frame of reference is an essential component of group
cohesion. Ideological purity, under these conditions, will confer authority, which can
be used in turn to build group unity, establish a hierarchy of command, and,
ultimately, employ the movement as a revolutionary force. (McCormick 1993, 54)
Senderismo has an ideological certitude that appeals to those who have little sense of
political efficacy. Gonzalo Thought promises an authoritarian utopia to the minority

of Peruvians who participate in political violence. At the same time, those who are not
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politically correct are labeled counter-revolutionaries, and are often the recipients of

the most severe revolutionary justice.

The “Two-Line Struggle”

Following Abimael Guzman’s 1992 arrest by DINCOTE (National Counter-Terrorism
Directorate), he subsequently called for talks with the government. Consequently, the

party split along two ideological lines (the “two-line struggle”) over continuance of the
guerrilla war. One group, Sendero Negro followed Guzman’s belief in negotiations

with the government. Another faction, referred to as Sendero Rojo, vowed to continue

fighting until the end.16

Formed under the leadership Oscar Ramirez Durand, (“Comrade Feliciano”),
Sendero Rojo has continued (as of July 1996) to inflict limited damage on the Peruvian
State. During March and April 1996, Sendero Rojo participated in seventeen armed

actions. Notably, a follower of Guzman was assassinated in Lima for pursuing peace
accords with the government [Trans.] (Caretas 1996b, 34).17 The Emergency Central
16 Sendero Rojo’s position, like that of most revolutionaries and terrorists, is that it is fighting
injustice by continuing the armed struggle. “Does the necessity for holding peace talks exist in . . .
[Peru]? No basis or necessity exists for this, much less with a government that never tires of
submitting the people to hunger and misery” (Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru 1994,
2).
17 The Senderista murdered, “Negro Jose,” was shot once in the head, twice in the upper
body, and his body dynamited. This was done to encourage others to abandon the revisionist line
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Committee of Sendero Rojo has asserted that those who wish to pursue peace accords

are working to undermine the party and the revolution:
The individuals that persist in the slander are a handful of friends of Yankee
imperialism and the treacherous and genocidal dictatorship, spreading propaganda
that the intelligence service has been circulating since .. . July [1993] as part of the
psychological war and today they sinisterly ascribe it to Chairman Gonzalo who is in
the most complete isolation and cut off from communication, persisting in their
wicked and insane plan of assassinating him and calling in desperation to hold back
the 4th military plan and exchange the just and correct slogan we have established “In
defense of the leadership, against the genocidal dictatorship!” for one of a “peace
accord” by which they show their concentrated hate against Chairman Gonzalo, the
Party, the people’s war and the people. (Central Committee, Communist Party of
Peru 1993, 2)

The pursuance of peace accords by Guzman and Sendero Negro has presented Sendero

Rojo with the challenge of reinvigorating the revolution. The prospects for PCP-SL
overcoming the “two-line struggle” and resuming its revolution appears difficult to gage

at this point.18

Chapter Summary
Despite recent worldwide trends, SL is continuing the struggle for worldwide Marxist

and participate in the armed struggle [Trans.] (Caretas 1996, 34).
18 Attempting to analyze the future of SL is extremely difficult. During the 1980 s few people
took the movement seriously until they “. . . demonstrated . . . that they . . . [could] carry out
dramatic actions even under maximum security conditions” (Central Intelligence Agency [1985?], 1).
By the early 1990's many people were concerned over a Sendero victory. Following the capture of
Guzman, many predicted an end to the movement. However, in the four years following the capture
of Guzman, Sendero Luminoso has continued a limited guerrilla campaign.
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revolution. Following principles developed in previous mass-based insurgencies, SL

developed as a social force before beginning its armed struggle. The movement has
concentrated on organizing mass support for its people’s war.

Nevertheless,

widespread backing of the guerrillas has been less than expected (at least by SL).
Much of Sendero’s support has been generated by the inadequate response fielded by

the Peruvian armed forces, which has, consistently brutalized the masses. Does the
capture of Guzman and the ensuing “two line struggle” spell the end of SL? Only time

will answer this perplexing question.
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Chapter V

Conclusion

One of the issues most frequently raised, explicitly or implicitly, in studies which deal
with SL is the relation between unrealized aspirations and the ideological attraction of
the movement. Yet, few works postulate at length on this issue. This study has
provided a brief foray into the various factors which link aspirational deprivation and

the ideological appeal of Sendero Luminoso.

The evidence presented here bolsters the argument that a combination of
disenfranchised individuals1 with a disciplined party organization capable of focusing
discontent contributed to the growth of Sendero Luminoso. Without this unique

amalgamation of factors it is unlikely that SL would have progressed as a mass-based

insurgency; concordantly:
The potency of ideological innovations. . . [have] been reinforced by organizational
devices that mobilize followings, keep them in being, and allow thoughtful strategic
actions instead of impulsive mob violence. That is not to say that conspiratorial
organizations alone can make insurgencies—nor the converse, that insurgencies can
be suppressed by calculated force. Organization harnesses the grievances and
fantasies of the oppressed, as revolutionary ideology gives them expression. (Desai
and Eckstein 1990, 458)

1 Disenfranchisement is particularly acute for moderately educated provincial Peruvians.
“Young people find themselves in a no-man’s land between two worlds: on the one hand, the
traditional Andean world of their parents whose myths, rites, customs they no longer fully share, and
on the other hand, the Western world, or more precisely the urban, criollo one, a world which rejects
them as provincials, mestizos, speakers of Quechua” (Degregori 1991, 241).
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Senderismo dictates that social grievances are best addressed through the use of party
directed political violence. The “scientific ideology” of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-

Gonzalo Thought asserts that political violence without the dictatorship of the party is

reactionary. Similarly, the utopia of a communist world becomes achievable only
through the party and its politically correct ideology.

Senderismo’s violence appeals to those who perceive their goals as unattainable
through conventional channels. Under the right circumstances, the frustration which
arises from incongruent aspirations and achievements is translatable to political
violence. One may hypothesize that individuals with expectations of success which is

unfulfilled perceive a greater loss, and concordantly higher level of frustration, than
those with lower expectations:
... we may postulate that perception of increasing relative gratification will produce
a greater readiness for political violence than perception of no change because the
person who sees himself as doing better now or in the future will desire to insure that
such increased satisfaction actually is maintained or attained. And if a person believes
that his gains could turn out to be ephemeral, than the desire to insure that one gets
what one expects, by those who expect to have more to loose, will be as much as an
impetus to political violence as will dissatisfaction generated by perception of
decreasing relative gratification on the part of those who expect to have less and less
to loose. (Grofman and Muller 1973, 538)

One study found that 29 percent of those convicted as terrorists in Peru have attended

J
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a university without obtaining a degree (Chavez de Paz 1989, 41).2

Sendero’s

beginnings as a university movement undoubtably contributed to this high percentage.

Yet, die movement’s attraction long after it was marginalized at UNSCH suggests that

there could be more complex factors at work here. These factors include a combination

of social and political determinants which combined in the formation of an extremely
violent political movement.

This essay offers no solutions for the complex problems of Peru. Instead, it has
highlighted a correlation between cause and effect.

Future investigation of the

relationship between aspirational deprivation and the ideological appeal of PCP-SL is
unequivocally warranted. For example, research of SL as a vehicle of empowerment

for women,3 the underemployed and traditionally oppressed racial groups would make
a substantial contribution to the literature. A weakness in a some previous works has

been the tendency to prescribe simplistic solutions for Peru’s complex problems.
Uninsightfiil analysis only compounds the problem of Sendero Luminoso.

2 Interestingly, almost five percent of convicted terrorists held professional titles or post
graduate studies. Contrastingly, only one point five percent of narcotrafficers have attained this level
of education (Chavez de Paz 1989, 41).

3 This is not meant to suggest that the role of women in SL has been completely unexplored.
See, Carol Andreas, “Women at War,” in Fatal Attraction: Peru’s Shining Path (NACLA: Report
on the Americas, vol. XXIV, No. 4, December/January, 1990-1991); Robin Kirk, Grabado en
piedra: Las mujeres de Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Institute de Estudios Peruanos, 1993).
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Appendix A

Glossary

APRA: Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, (American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance) former President Alan Garcia’s Political party. It was founded
in the 1930's by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre.
Catnpesino: Peasant (lacks much of the negativity associated with the English
translation).
FIR: Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Front of the Left).
Trotskyist guerrilla movement led by Hugo Blanco in the 1960's.

A

Foco-. Cuban inspired revolutionary theory where the guerrillas are the “focus” of
revolution.
Gonzalo Thought: Abimael Guzman’s (a.k.a. “President Gonzalo”) blend of
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally Maoism and the writings of Jose Carlos
Mariategui. Gonzalo Thought is the ideology PCP-SL.

MIR: Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary
Left). A militant splinter group of the APRA party.
Movimiento Popular Peru: A pro-Sendero organization which opposes RCP-USA and
the RIM. In the U.S. it is based in Queens, NY and publishes a magazine called The
New Flag.

MRTA: Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement).
PCP: Partido Comunista del Peru (Communist Party of Peru), a.k.a. Sendero
Luminoso. Peruvian Marxist-Leninist-Maoist largely rural-based insurgents.

RCP-USA: Revolutionary Communist Party, USA. A minuscule Maoist political
party led by Chairman Bob Avakian that publishes Revolutionary Worker and various
other publications. RCP-USA is united with Sendero in the RIM.
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RIM: Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. A loose grouping of Maoist
revolutionary communist parties, including the PCP. It publishes A World to Win in
various languages, and appears to be based in London.
UNSCH: Universidad National de San Cristobal de Huamanga. The university where
Abimael Guzman began Sender© Luminoso. It is located in the impoverished Andean
Department of Ayacucho.
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Appendix B
Peruvian Political History

1532_______________________ _______________ ____________________
Spanish colonialism begins in Peru with Pizarro’s ambush of the Inca Atahualpa.
1560s___________________________ ____________ ______________________

Indians who believe themselves possessed by spirits predict the expulsion of the
Spanish and the Christian God during the Taki Onqoy (dancing sickness) movement.
1720-1790_________________________________________________________
Over one-hundred Indian rebellions are launched against Spanish rule. Perceived as
a threat to white supremacy, they all are violently suppressed.
1742______________________________________________________________
Juan Santos Atahualpa launches a messianic insurrection against Spanish rule. This
rebellion serves as a forerunner for Tupac Amaru’s insurrection a half century later.
1820-1824__________________________________________________

Despite Pern’s War of Independence, little changes for the Indian masses.
1881_____________________________________________

Pern and Bolivia are defeated by Chile in the War of the Pacific, Some whites
collaborate with the Chilean invaders in the suppression of Indians.
1895-1899________________________ ______ ____________________________

The Pierola government launches a campaign to build schools, hospitals and improve
the infrastructure of Peru. Still, racial stratification remains a feature of Peruvian
society.
1924________________________________________________________________

Peruvian Victor Raul Haya de la Torre founds the Popular Revolutionary Alliance of
America (APRA) in Mexico. APRA calls for an “anti-imperialist front” throughout
Latin America.
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1919-1930_ ________________ ___________________________ ________________

The Leguia government works to end the exploitation of peasant communities by
recognizing their legal rights. Nonetheless, a fear of communism prevents fundamental
change. Following the stock market crash in 1929, Leguia is replaced by strongmen
Luis Sanchez Cerro and Oscar Benavides.
1932________________________________

APRA initiates an insurrection in an attempt to overthrow populist dictator Luis
Sanchez Cerro. The insurrectionists are suppressed as hundreds of APRA members
are executed.
1956-1964______________________________________________________________

Pern witnesses the largest peasant movements in South America. While the peasant’s
motto is “land or death,” few are actually killed.
1961___________________________________________________________________

Hugo Blanco establishes the Trotskyist Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario
(Revolutionary Front of the Left, or FIR). The FIR seeks to create peasant unrest and
begin armed struggle. Most of FIR’s activities are limited to the department of Cusco.
1962

Hector Bejar Rivera and other fonner members of the Penivian Communist Party found
the foco style Ejercito de Liberation National (Army of National Liberation or ELN).
The guerrillas are mostly intellectuals and students who never gain the support of the
rural masses. Around the same time, a splinter group of the APRA Party, the
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, or
MIR) begins a guerrilla war under the direction of Luis de la Puente Uceda.
1963

... _

._________ ________________________

Hugo Blanco is arrested by Peruvian police, leaving the FIR largely ineffective.
1965

_

_________________________

Hector Bejar Rivera is arrested by police and held until 1970. The ELN s lack of mass
support plays an important role in its 1965 defeat. With roughly 100 cadre, the MIR
is easily pacified by the government’s counterinsurgency. The small Vanguatdia
Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Vanguard, or VR) is founded by dissident members
(mostly intellectuals) of the APRA party. VR advocates a mass movement against the
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government, which it fails to organize.
1968__________________________ ___________ ___ ____________________

Obstructed by conservatives in Parliament, President Fernando Belaunde is unable to
hilly implement his promised nationalization of the oil wells of International Petroleum
Company (IPC).

October 3: General Juan Velasco stages a coup, declaring the rule of the
“Revolutionary Government of the Anned Forces.” Velasco undertakes the
nationalization of IPC and extensive agricultural reforms. He also begins the restriction
of political parties and freedom of expression.

1975_____________________________________________________________
A military junta deposes Velasco and begins a series of counter-reforms. Elements of
the MIR establish the foco styled Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, which
advocates a combination of parliamentary and anned actions.

1977-1978________________________________________________________
hi response to the military government’s counter-reforms, several teacher and student
walkouts cumulate in Peru’s first national strikes.
1980_____________________________________ _________________________

The return to the civilian government of President Fernando Belaunde is marred by
Sendero Luminoso’s initiation of the anned struggle. As debates over the reinstitution
of the death penalty for subversives rage in congress, former guerrilla Hugo Blanco
runs as a candidate for president.
1985______________________________________ ________________________

The APRA candidate, populist Alan Garcia wins the presidential election.
Subsequently, the government is mired by cormption and links to the right-wing
Rodrigo Franco death squad.
1988______________________

Inflation reaches 1,800 percent.
1990________________________ ______________ _____________

Alberto Fujimori of the Cambio 90 party wins the presidential election.
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1992________________________________________________________________
April 5: Fujimori suspends the constitution and abolishes congress in a bloodless coup
supported by the military.1
1993________________________________________________________________
Time magazine declares Fujimori its “Man of the Year in Latin America” [Trans.]
(DESCO 1994e).

ice president until the coup, at which time the
1 “Maximo San Roman . . . was Fujimori’s vice
disbanded Congress elected him president. . .” ((Americas Watch 1993, 1).

I

66

Appendix C
Pre-Armed Struggle Chronology of Senderismo1
1894 nr 1895_____________________

Jose Carlos Mariategui is bom in Lima.
1914______ _________________________________________________________

With little formal schooling, Mariategui begins writing under the pen name of “Juan
Croniqueur.”
1917____________________________________________

The socialist newspaper La Razon is founded by Mariategui.
1919_____________________________________________________________ _

Peruvian President Agusto B. Leguia shuts down La Razon, and suggests that
Mariategui take a sabbatical in Europe.

1923___________________
Mariategui returns to Peru.
1926

________

Mariategui founds and edits the Marxist journal Amauta.
1928_____________________________ __________________________________

Mariategui publishes Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, and founds the
Communist Party of Peru.
1930_____________

Death of Mariategui.

1 Sources for this section come from Peter Stem, Sendero Luminoso'. An Annotated
bibliography of the Shining Path Guerrilla Movement, 1980-1993 (New Mexico: SALALM
Secretariat, 1995); Peter Johnson, “The Consistency of a Revolutionary Movement: Peru s Sendero
Luminoso and Its Texts, 1965-1986,” in Michael T. Martin and Terry R. Kandal s Studies of
Development and Change in the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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1934__________________________
Abimael Guzman Reynoso (“Chairman Gonzalo”) is bom in Mollendo.
195.3______________________________________________________________

Guzman completes Iris two theses, one on Kant’s philosophy of space, the other on the
bourgeois democratic state, and graduates from Universidad National San Augustin
in Arequipa.
196?_______________________________________________________________

Guzman begins teaching tire philosophy of education at the Universidad National San
Cristobal de Huamanga (UNSCH).
1964_______________________________________________________________

Mirroring the Sino-Soviet Split, Guzman’s pro-Chinese faction splits from the pro
Moscow PCP leadership, and forms the Partido Comunista Peruano-Bandera Roja
(PCP-BR).
1965-1967?______________________________________ ___________________

Guzman travels to China during the Cultural Revolution to study Marxism, politics, and
military tactics.
1970_____________________________________________________________
PCP-BR expels Guzman for “leftist opportunism.” Guzman then forms the Communist
Party of Pern-Shining Path.

1970-1977
Guzman’s position in the UNSCH administration combines with the college’s unique
outreach programs to aid in recruitment of future guerrillas.
1975__________________________
..._____________ ________________
Peoples’ schools for political education are established in the department of Ayacucho.

1978_______________________________
PCP-SL party leadership goes underground.
1979___________________________ __ ______ _____________________ —
The Partido Comunista del Peru—Sendero Luminoso holds its First Conference.
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Appendix D
Chronology of Political Violence
1980_______________________________

March-April: Inicio de lucha armada-]LA or beginning of armed struggle (Stem, P.
1995, xxiii).

May: Sendero’s first violent action, the burning of ballot boxes in Chuschi, Cangallo
province, Ayacucho. The political objective is to boycott the general elections of 1980
[Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 809).

November: Minister of the Interior Jose Maria de la Jara declares that Peru is
encountering acts of sabotage, not a wave of terrorism [Trans.] (ibid., 370).
December: A state of emergency is declared in Ayacucho (Stem, P. 1995, xxiii).

Yearly Summary: Three people are estimated to have been killed in political violence
during 1980 [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 36, 37).
1981_____________________________________

January: In Huamanga, Ayacucho there are fifteen explosions targeted at public
buildings [Trans.] (ibid., 815). Sinchis (anti-terrorist para-military police) go to
Ayacucho to combat Sendero (Stem, P. 1995, xxiii).
March: Guerrillas bum a church library in Lima. The office of ElectroPeru is
dynamited [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 817).

October: Sendero attacks police posts in Tambo (Stem, P. 1995, xxiii). A State of
Emergency is declared in Ayacucho (Johnson 1989, 291).
Yearly Summary: During 1981 there are between four to seven deaths related to
political violence [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 36, 37).
1982__________________________

March: A prison break frees 247 Sendero Luminoso suspects, including nineteen year
old Edith Largos from an Ayacucho prison. Sendero dynamites Lima power lines, and
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blacks out Lima for the first time (Johnson 1989, 291).

July: Sendero begins public executions of government officials, merchants, peasant
and labor leaders (ibid.). The U.S. Embassy, the offices of Coca-Cola, and the home
of the British Ambassador are dynamited [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 834, 835).
August: An experimental farm at Allpachaca is destroyed by guerrillas (Johnson 1989,
291). hi Jaen province, Senderistas take over a high school and teach classes [Trans.]
(DESCO 1989, 837).
September: A college professor in Cangallo is assassinated for refusing to read a proPCP-SL proclamation to his students [Trans.] (ibid., 841). There is a major public
funeral procession in Ayacucho for Senderista Edith Largos, killed by government
forces (Stem, P. 1995, xxiv).

December: The execution of twenty-one civilian and government officials in Ayacucho
results in the declaration of martial law and entry of the army (Johnson 1989, 291).

Yearly Summary: There are between 128 to 170 deaths related to political violence
during 1982 [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 36, 37).
1983______________________________________

January: Eight journalists are murdered by government supported villagers in
Uchuraccay (Stem, P. 1995, xxiv).

April: hi the province of Victor Fajardo, sixty-seven peasants from Lucanamarca are
murdered. In the same province, forty-five peasants, including ten children from
various districts are killed by PCP-SL [Trans.] (DESCO, 856).
August: Twenty-seven members of the Senderista leadership are captured (Johnson
1989,292).

November: Senderistas murder mayor Victor Anas in Cerro de Pasco (ibid., 292).
The headquarters of Accion Popular is bombed to intimidate voters. Insurgents
attempt to bomb the barracks of the U.S. Marines stationed at the U.S. Embassy in
Lima. Newspapers in Bolivia are dynamited by “Sendero Luminoso, Bolivia. [Trans.]
(DESCO 1989, 876, 877).
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Yearly Summary: Various estimates place the number of casualties between 2,807
to 3,177 for 1983. Most victims are unarmed noncombatants [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).

1983-84: Roundas campesinas (peasant “self defense” patrols) are established in the
sierra (Stem, P. 1995, xxiv).
1984_______________________________ _ ____________________ ____ _______

January: Presumed insurgents murder forty peasants in Urancancha [Trans.] (DESCO
1989,883).

April: Antonio Diaz Martinez, head of the comando politico-militar of Sendero
Luminoso, is arrested (Johnson 1989, 292). The home of the U.S. Ambassador is
bombed in Lima [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 888).
June: MRTA begins its guerilla war (Stem, P. 1995, xxiv). There is a question over
whether MRTA is responsible for bombs thrown at the Bank of La Victoria in Lima.
[Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 892).
July: The Peruvian Army is given direct control over combating internal subversion
(Johnson 1989, 292). Forty peasants are murdered for collaborating with the police in
La Mar province [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 894).

August: In Cangallo, Victor Fajardo and Huanta fifty-one peasants, including fifteen
children are murdered. In Huanta province, fifty civilians are killed, some corpses
show marks from torture. A confrontation with the armed forces leaves thirty-five
peasants dead [Trans.] (ibid., 901, 903).

Yearly Summary: Estimates place the number of people killed in political violence
during 1984 between 3,704 to 4,319 [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).
1985_________________________________ _________ ____________________
February: A confrontation in Lima leaves sixty-five civilians dead. Senderistas or
paramilitaries kill thirty-five noncombatants in Leoncio Prado [Trans.] (ibid., 921).

March: In the province of Leoncio Prado, thirty-five mutilated corpses are discovered
[Trans.] (ibid., 922).
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July: The lieutenant governor in Ayacucho is decapitated after a public trial (Johnson
1989, 294).

August: Peruvian Army troops murders sixty-nine peasants from the town of
Accomarca. In the same area, thirty corpses are found shortly later [Trans ] (DESCO
1989, 937, 938).
Yearly Summary: During 1985 there are between 1,200 to 1,359 deaths related to
political violence in Peru [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).
1986________________________________________

March: Four professors in Santiago de Chuco receive summary executions from a
Senderista “people’s court” [Trans.] (ibid., 955).
June: Sendero destroys associated agricultural enterprises in Puno. PCP-SL inmates
in Lima and Callao prisons (Lurigancho, “El Fronton” and “Santa Barbara”) riot; large
numbers of prisoners (124, 115? and two respectively) are killed by the military
[Trans.] (ibid., 956). Senderista propaganda later refers to the riots as the “Day of
Heroism.” (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 1986, 32).1

July: The Embassy of the USSR is bombed in Lima. In Huanta province, a “burro
bomb” explodes [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 969, 971).
September: A government patrol of Sinchis open fire on a peasant family celebrating
a birthday party, killing twelve civilians [Trans.] (ibid., 976).
Yearly Summary: By the end of 1986, between 1,268 to 1,274 people have been
murdered in acts of political violence. Most victims are noncombatants [Trans.] (ibid.,
36, 37).

1 The subversive ideological line asserts that “[t]he reaction took sinister aim against the
prisoners of war and planned their genocidal annihilation. . . . [TJhe prisoners of war rose up in
rebellion against the new genocide under way” (Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist
Movement 1986, 33). This style of rationalization is typical of PCP-SL propaganda which has used
the riots as a rallying point in their insurrection.
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1987____________________________

January: The mayor of the district of Hongos, province of Yauyos, is captured by
twenty Senderistas and later traded for food (Johnson 1989,295). The Indian Embassy
in Lima is bombed, hi Lima, Cesar Lopez Silva, national director of PAP (Peruvian
Aprista Party) is assassinated in front of his home [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 986, 987).
April: The secretary general of the PAP for the district of Corpangui is shot to death
by Senderistas. Government forces murder ninety-seven peasants, including forty-two
children, in Hierbabuena, Huamanga province [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 996).

Yearly Summary: Between 697 and 941 casualties of mostly civilians are estimated
for 1987 [Trans.] (ibid., 36, 37).
1988_______________________________________________________________

May: Sendero stages its Labor Day parade in Lima to celebrate the “Day of the
Worker” (Stem, P. 1995, xxiv).
June: Two U.S. AID employees are assassinated in Huancayo [Trans.] (DESCO,
1045). PCP-SL’s “number two,” Osman Morote is captured (Stem, P. 1995, xxiv).
July: El Diario publishes the “Interview of the century” with “President Gonzalo.”
The Comando Rodrigo Franco death squad assassinates Morote’s defense lawyer
(ibid.).
November-December: Sendero sacks and destroys the SAIS [Sociedad Agricola de
Interes Social] Cahuide farms (Stem, P. 1995, xxiv).
Human Cost of Political Violence: The death toll for 1988 is estimated at 1,986
mostly noncombatants [Trans.] (DESCO 1989, 37).
1989____________________________ _______________ ____________________

January: Sendero “generated organisms” call for armed strikes in Lima s industrial
zones (Stem, P. 1995 xxiv).
March: The Ucliiza police post, in the Upper Huallaga Valley is overrun by PCP-SL
(ibid.).

*
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November: Victor Taype, president of the National Federation of Metallurgical
Workers, is detained and tortured by police (Americas Watch 1990, 72-73). Sendero’s
newspaper El Diario is shut down because it calls for the assassination of several
public figures and glorifies Sendero’s execution of municipal candidates (ibid., 71).
Yearly Summary: During 1989 Sendero has murdered 1,526, MRTA has killed 161,
Comando Rodrigo Franco eleven, unidentified terrorist groups 153, “narcotrafficers”
127, police forces 342, armed forces 886 (Americas Watch 1990, 22).
1990___________________________________________________________

March: An “armed strike” is called by Sendero in Lima (Stem, P. 1995, xxiv).
April: There is an assault launched on the Santa Lucia antinarcotics base (U.S.
operated Vietnam style base) in the Upper Huallaga Valley (ibid.).
July: Forty-five MRTA guerrillas escape from prison (ibid.).

August: Economic austerity measures (“Fujishock”) are announced (ibid.).
Yearly Summary: Sendero is responsible for slightly less than half the estimated 3,452
deaths related to political violence in 1990 (Americas Watch 1991, 6). According to
government statistics, there are 1,429 insurgents captured in 1990 (El Peruano 1995,
A3).
1991_____________________________ ____________ _______________________

February: A raid on a safe house in Lima yields video tape of a tipsy Guzman
dancing like a Peruvian “Zorba the Greek.” (Stem, P. 1995, xxv).
May-June: “Red Month”: Senderistas launch waves of urban bombings and blackouts
(ibid.).

May: Thirty men, women and children are killed by PCP-SL in the Union Alto
Saniveri settlement. San Ramon de Pangoa community, in the district of San Martin
de Pangoa (Amnesty International 1993, 39).
June: Sendero declares “strategic equilibrium” (Stem, P. 1995, xxv). Senderistas
assassinate tire leader of tire Federation Departamental de Campesinos de Puno [Puno
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Departmental Federation of Peasants] (Americas Watch 1991, 27).

August: Sixteen men, women and children from the community of Iquicha, near
Uchuraccay, Huanta province, are murdered by government forces (Amnesty
International 1992, 34).

Yearly Summary: One estimate places the total number of deaths for 1991 at 3,106.
Between 1981 and 1991 roughly 5,419 people are “disappeared.” By January 1992,
over 4,000 of these remain unresolved (ibid., 1). Mostly because of political violence,
Pern’s internally displaced population is estimated to be around 200,000 (Kirk 1993,
1). The Peruvian Government claims that 696 subversives are captured during the year
(El Peruano 1995, A3).
1992

February 15: Sendero murders community activist Maria Elena Moyano. (Stem, P.
1995, xxv).
March: The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs holds hearings on PCP-SL (United States Congress 1992a, 1).
April-October: At least twenty-six people are “disappeared” by government security
forces. Of these, twenty-two are later found dead and four remain “disappeared”
(Amnesty International 1993, 22).

May: Senderistas battle police in Canto Grande; fifty prisoners die (Stem, P. 1995,
xxv).

July: Hooded soldiers “disappear” a number of university students at La Cantuta.
Following the trial, a Peruvian court questions the very existence of the “disappeared”
(Americas Watch 1993, 2). A large car bomb devastates Miraflores, a wealthy Lima
suburb (Stem, P. 1995, xxv).
September: Abimael Guzman is arrested in his safe house above a ballet studio in
Lima. Shortly thereafter, he delivers an unrepentant speech before the press. Sendero
is now headed by Oscar Alberto Ramirez Durand, known as “Comrade Feliciano
[Trans.] (La Repubhca 1992b, 2). The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, again holds hearings on Sendero
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Luminoso (United States Congress 1992b, 1).

October: Guzman is sentenced to life imprisonment on the island of San Lorenzo
[Trans.] (La Republica 1992a, 2).
Yearly Summary: Amnesty International estimates that eighty-five percent of Peru’s
human rights violations are committed by government forces (Amnesty International
1992, 1). The overall death toll for 1992 is approximately 2,756. About sixty percent
are killed in armed clashes, while thirty percent are murdered in cold blood (Americas
Watch 1993, 9). Official estimates claim that 2,861 insurgents are captured during
1992 (El Peruano 1995, A3).
1993
October: Guzman offers to negotiate with the Peruvian government, causing PCP-SL
to split into two factions (the “two-line struggle”). A group of pro-Sendero agitators
attempts to interrupt a presentation being given by Fujimori in New York [Trans.] (ibid.
1993b). North Americans from the Revolutionary Communist Party-USA contact
Senderistas in Ayacucho to offer political and economic support [Trans.] (Expreso
1994, A3)

November: A law of repentance has encouraged 1,300 terrorists to cease insurgent
activities [Trans.] (ibid. 1993a).
December: Two-hundred Senderistas imprisoned in Chorrillos write a letter to
Fujimori accepting the orders of Abimael Guzman to cease belligerence [Trans.] (ibid.).

Yearly Summary: Insurgent and government forces continue to violate the laws of
war. Of the 443 persons judged by military tribunals, 420 are found guilty, with sixtyfive percent receiving the maximum penalty, life imprisonment [Trans.] (ibid. 1994f).
There are supposedly 5,413 insurgents captured by government forces during the year
[Trans.] (El Peruano 1995, A3).
1994___________________________ ___________________

April: There armed forces are alleged to have used duty war (i.e. widespread torture
and rape) during Operation “Aries” in the coca rich Upper Huallaga Valley [Trans.]
(DESCO 1994d).
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May: The military declares that Operation “Aries” has effected 40 percent of SL
forces in the Upper Huallaga Valley [Trans.] (ibid. 1994c).
July: There is some question over whether Abimael Guzman has changed his mind on
the renouncement of armed struggle [Trans.] (ibid. 1994b).
Yearly Summary: There were 1,200 trials for the crime of terrorism in Peruvian
courts in 1994, of these, 1,083 were sentenced. Despite setbacks, Feliciano’s Sendero
Rojo continues the armed struggle [Trans.] (ibid. 1994a). The Peruvian Government
alleges that 4,631 insurgents were captured during the year, bringing the total to 15,030
since 1990 (£7 Perucmo 1995, A3).

1995
March: Margie Clavo Peralta, "Comrade Nancy,” an important leader of the
Emergency Central Committee of Sendero Luminoso, is captured by DINCOTE.
Several other “comrades” are arrested as well [Trans.] (Expreso 1995, Al2).
May: Sendero detonates a car bomb with between 70 to 100 kilos of dynamite in front
of the Hotel Maria Angola in Lima’s upscale district of Miraflores, killing five people
[Trans.] (El Comercio 1995, A8).

July: President Fujimori states that “. . . sooner or later. . . [Oscar Ramirez Durand]
will be captured dead or alive [Trans.]” (DESCO 1995a).
1996__________________________________________________________________

May: In the Villa El Salvador section of Lima, Senderistas from Feliciano’s faction
assassinate a follower of Guzman who favors the peace process [Trans.] (Caretas
1996b).

June: One of the “ambassadors” of Sendero Luminoso abroad, Julian Salazar Calero
is detained by the FBI in New York City to be extradited to Pern for the crime of
terrorism [Trans.] (DESCO 1996a).
July: Two car bombs explode in Lima, one 200 meeters from the Palacio de Gobierno
[Trans.] (Caretas 1996c).
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